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Seek the truth, hear the truth, learn the truth, love the truth, speak the truth, hold the truth, 
and defend the truth until death. – Jan Hus 
Democracy is not only a form of government, it is not only what is written in the Constitution; 
democracy is a perspective on life, it consists in the trust in people, in humanness and 
humanity, and there is no trust without love, no love without trust. I once said that democracy 
is a discussion. But true discussion is only possible, where people trust each other and 
honestly search for truth. Democracy, that is a conversation between equals, reflection of free 
citizens in front of the entire public. – Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk 
Truth and love must prevail over lies and hatred. – Václav Havel 
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Democracy is in crisis around the world. Boosted by global phenomena such as globalization 
and the development of internet, along with a series of crises, which widened the gap between 
the elite and citizens, this trend was characterized by the rise of populism in both mature 
democracies and post-communist countries. The former model democratizers in Central-
Eastern Europe turned into model democratic backsliders. The illiberal tendencies in the 
region have been generally judged by the Hungarian and Polish playbook. Although not 
as dramatically, also in Czech Republic democracy has been declining, mostly since the 
government of Andrej Babiš in 2017 and the reelection of Miloš Zeman president in 2018. 
This work examines the changes in the official post-1989 discourse through a two-
dimensional discourse analysis, and thus explains what are the origins and character of the 
current democracy crisis,  which arenas of democracy have been affected the most thus far, 
and finally if the “truth will prevail” over the illiberal challenge. Based on the theoretical 
concepts of democracy, transitology, democratic backsliding, populism 
and postfunctionalism, and an overview of historical-cultural context, we analyze the 
rhetorical strategies, domestic policy, and foreign policy dominant in the corpus of selected 
speeches of the Prime Minister and President. Next, we assess the impact of their new 
discourse on the arenas of democracy contrasting EIU’s Democracy Index and Freedom 
House’s Nations in Transit rankings. Overall, we sustain that the rise of the Czech illiberal 
populists has been rather a consequence than the origin of the current crisis, that the character 
of their new discourse is particular despite similarities with the backsliding neighbors, 
and finally, that there is hope for truth to prevail, consisting in a reform of certain arenas 
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Democracia está em crise em todo o mundo. Reforçado pelos fenómenos globais como 
a globalização e o desenvolvimento da Internet, junto com uma série de crises, 
que aumentaram o fosso entre a elite e os cidadãos, esta dinâmica foi caraterizada 
pela ascensão de populismo em ambas democracias maduras e países pós-comunistas. 
Os antigos exemplos da democratização na Europa Central e de Leste tornaram-se exemplos 
de democratic backsliding. As tendências iliberais na região têm sido geralmente julgadas 
com base na cartilha húngara e polaca. Embora não tão dramaticamente, também 
a democracia na República Checa tem estado em declínio, sobretudo desde o início 
do governo de Andrej Babiš em 2017 e a reeleição presidencial de Miloš Zeman em 2018. 
Este trabalho examina as mudanças no discurso oficial pós-1989 através de uma análise 
de discurso de duas dimensões, e assim explica quais são as origens e o caráter da crise 
de democracia atual, quais arenas de democracia têm sido afetadas mais até agora, 
e finalmente se “a verdade prevalece” contra o desafio iliberal. Com base nos conceitos 
teóricos de democracia, transitologia, democratic backsliding, populismo e pósfuncionalismo, 
e um resumo do contexto histórico-cultural, analisamos as estratégias retóricas e as políticas 
doméstica e estrangeira dominantes no corpus de discursos selecionados do Primeiro-Ministro 
e do Presidente. Logo, avaliamos o impacto do seu novo discurso sobre as arenas 
de democracia contrastando os rankings do Índice de Democracia de EIU e de Nations 
in Transit de Freedom House. Contudo, defendemos que a ascensão dos populistas 
na República Checa tem sido uma consequência mais do que a origem da crise atual, 
que o caráter do seu novo discurso é particular apesar de semelhanças com os seus vizinhos 
em retrocesso, e finalmente que há esperança para a verdade prevalecer, consistindo 
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Multiple reports confirm that global dissatisfaction with democracy has been growing 
for the past years, reaching its record in 2019, and affecting even mature democracies. The 
euphoria from the triumph of democracy marking the “end of history” after the end of the 
Cold War was replaced with gloomy discussions of democratic backsliding and even 
democratic reversal in many parts of the world. The series of global crises such as the 
economic crisis in 2008, the migrant crisis in 2015, and most recently the coronavirus crisis 
in 2020 have been deemed responsible for this regression, along with new challenges such 
as the globalization, the development of the internet, particularly the social media, or the 
hybrid warfare employed chiefly by China and Russia. In fact, the macrostructural conditions 
revealed the growing gap between the political elite and much of the electorate when it comes 
to the liberal democratic consensus. Consequently, the unexpected events of Brexit and the 
election of Donald Trump signaled the rise of populism, whose proponents politicized the 
issues traditional parties failed to address, offering the deluded voters quick and simple 
solutions to the complex problems. On one hand, these changes were positive for democracy 
boosting political participation due to global protests and higher voter turnout, on the other, 
populist policies led to “executive aggrandizement” in certain democracies limiting the rule 
of law and civil liberties. The latter trend has been exemplified by the one-time 
democratization frontrunners Hungary and Poland, nevertheless the neighboring Czech 
Republic has also been derailing from its official course taken after the Velvet Revolution 
in 1989, particularly since the first government of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš in 2017 and 
the reelection of President Miloš Zeman in 2018. 
Taking into account the country’s historical experience marked by 41 years of communist 
dictatorship preceded by the occupation of Nazis during the Second World War, I find 
essential to explore the origins of this retreat of democracy and look for its solutions to 
preserve the country’s freedom and its integration in the Western international structures. 
Furthermore, democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe is a current, and thus 
relevant phenomenon, however the research has been dominated by analyses of Hungary and 
Poland leaving the case of the Czech Republic insufficiently investigated. Moreover, the 
choice of topic has been motivated by my Czech origin, which can represent an advantage, 
enabling an insider perspective in the cultural-historical context especially through reading 




in the Czech language1 and life-long exposure to Czech education and media. Simultaneously, 
the personal importance of the topic could potentially cloud judgement, nevertheless it is 
important to note that there was a physical distancing from the object of the study during the 
redaction of this thesis, as I studied in Portugal and lived in Italy. In order to assess the current 
retreat of democracy in the Czech Republic and the associated risk of the country’s sliding 
back to totality, I will demonstrate in a two-dimensional discourse analysis how has the 
official political discourse transformed since the transition from communism to democracy 
in 1989 and which pillars of democracy have been the most affected thus far. While the first 
dimension focusing on a sub-systemic level of analysis is based on a selected corpus 
of speeches of the current political leaders, President Miloš Zeman and Prime Minister Andrej 
Babiš, the second dimension offers a systemic perspective founded on a comparison 
of international democracy ranking indices, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy 
Index and the Freedom House’s Nations in Transit. Considering the breadth of the subject 
of democracy and the related (de)democratization processes, in contrast to the limited length 
of the thesis, there was a need to focus on a single case study and select a temporal framing 
for a more in-depth analysis.      
In sum, my work asks the following the research questions and proposes hypotheses:  
1. What are the origins and character of the retreat of democracy in the Czech Republic? 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Thanks to the mobilization of exclusive identity following a series 
of internal and external crises, which caused the dislocation of the official post-
transition discourse, populist TAN forces, represented by the current Prime Minister 
Babiš and President Zeman, managed to rise to power, and gradually implement 
“executive aggrandizement”. 
2. Which arenas of democracy have been the most affected and why? 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Due to the accumulation of economic, political and media power 
in the hands of the Prime Minister, coupled with president’s attempts at stretching his 
constitutional powers, no arena of democracy has been left intact, with the political 
society being affected the most so far. 
 
 
1 All used texts originally in the Czech language were translated into English by the author of this research. 




As for the structure of the thesis, in the Theoretical Framework, we will review and 
critically evaluate the literature concerning transitions to and backsliding from democracy. 
First and foremost, we will attempt to conceptualize democracy, considering its minimalist 
and maximalist definitions in The Concept of Democracy chapter. Next, we will discuss 
democratization process through the optics of the Transition Paradigm and its Critics. The 
chapter entitled Problems of Democracy will investigate the “reverse transition paradigm” and 
the reasons behind de-democratization process, defining the related phenomena 
of Democratic Backsliding and Populism. Finally, the chapter Postfunctionalism analyzes the 
democratization and de-democratization processes within the context of the European 
(dis)integration theories. The section dedicated to Methodological Options offers a short 
overview of the developments in the social science research on the Central and Eastern 
European region, and specifically the Czech case, presents discourse analysis as the preferred 
Research Theory, and lastly explains the choice and employment of methods as part of the 
Research Strategy. Before else, the Empirical Investigation highlights important historically 
specific discourses in the chapter Historical-Cultural Context, which have formed Czech 
Identity Post-1989 and contributed to Czech Identity Today. Based on the outcomes of the 
discourse analysis, the chapter dedicated to the New Official Discourse(s) will present the 
rhetorical strategies and dominant domestic and foreign policy agenda of the President and the 
Prime Minister, with a special focus on their construction of social antagonism. The 
penultimate chapter entitled Impact of the New Discourse on the Arenas of Democracy 
contrasts and evaluates the international scores of the Czech democracy pillars converting 
them into the five variables of democratic consolidation, “arenas of democracy” as suggested 
by Linz and Stepan (1996). In conclusion, synthesizing the findings from the theoretical and 
empirical parts we will answer the question enunciated in the subtitle of this thesis, Will 








2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 The Concept of Democracy 
Democracy, derived from the Greek terms demos (the people), and kratein (rule), 
is usually understood as “a form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the 
people as a whole” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). People may partake in the decision-
making directly or through elected officials, as there are two types of democracy, direct and 
representative. Besides this dual differentiation, the term has been modified by hundreds 
of adjectives with the goal of characterizing the diverse subtypes of democracy. In his famous 
essay “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Carothers (2002, p. 10) names some of these 
new terms denoting “qualified democracy” in countries transitioning from post-authoritarian 
regimes: “semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, 
pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual”. 
This reveals the complexity of the concept at hand and the issues arising with the attempts 
to define or measure it. Contemporary Western democracy, which originated in the city-states 
of Classical Athens and the Roman Republic, and further developed with the emergence 
of nation-states, is most often described as liberal. Influenced by the ideas of the architects 
of classical liberalism, particularly the philosopher John Locke and the economist Adam 
Smith, this form of government combines electoral democracy with the protection of civil 
liberties, hence emphasizing the separation of powers, rule of law and a system of checks and 
balances. Overall, in the words of the father of transitology, Rustow (1970, p. 339), 
democracy can nowadays be understood as “a process of ‘accommodation’ involving 
a combination of ‘division and cohesion’ and of ‘conflict and consent’”. 
According to Professor Stanislav Štěpáník (2018), most Western transitologists base their 
theories on the conceptual models of democracy developed by Joseph Schumpeter (1942) and 
Robert A. Dahl (1971). Schumpeter’s classical elitist model perceives democracy 
as a mechanism for competition between leaders. Besides contestation, Dahl also stresses 
participation in his two-dimensional model of polyarchy, a term describing actual democratic 
governance, as he deems the democratic ideal-type unachievable. In sum, both definitions 
of democracy can be considered minimalist. Compared to the maximalist approach, which is 
of little analytical use, minimalist definitions of democracy are preferred by many theorists 
and particularly ranking institutions. However, they can obscure reality leading 
to misevaluation and subsequent misclassification of diverse cases under one subtype.  




In order to avoid negative evaluations, many studies fall back on a minimalist definition of democracy based 
on electoral democracy with its “free” elections and some basic human rights. Supposedly, this allows these 
polities to qualify as democracies but at the high price of ignoring the “unfair” illusory and non-
representative nature of their elections and the actual socio-political exclusion of large communities, which 
prevents them from enjoying their individual freedoms. (Ágh, 2016, p. 9-10) 
Taking into account the fading dichotomy between democracy and autocracy due to the 
growing number of countries “in the gray zone”, Professor Attila Ágh alerts against such 
simplistic definitions suggesting a new system for defining the opposing regimes that would 
capture all the subtypes in between. Licia Cianetti, James Dawson and Seán Hanley (2018, 
p. 247) also denounce the present system of democratic measurement as flawed, “prone 
to inflating the democratic credentials of states whose political elites are willing to undertake 
superficial institutional reforms without any broader societal process to validate and embed 
the values implied by those institutions”. Consequently, the authors point to the difference 
between democratic stability and quality, advocating a Tillyan process-oriented perspective 
of democracy analysis. 
In his book Democracy (2007, p. 10), Charles Tilly distinguishes four main types 
of definitions of democracy: constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented. 
While Dahl’s five criteria2 for an ideal democracy fall in the last category, Tilly claims that 
they read as “a static yes-no checklist”. Instead, he proposes comparing the degree 
of democracy in diverse regimes, but also following the processes of democratization and de-
democratization in individual regimes through time. Thus, he rejects solely searching for 
definitions of an ideal-type political system and of conditions to achieve and maintain it, 
considering that “democratization is a dynamic process that always remains incomplete and 
perpetually runs the risk of reversal – of de-democratization” (p. xi). Taking into account the 
three historical waves of democratization, as popularized by the political scientist Samuel 
P. Huntington (1991)3, we may agree that transition to democracy is quite an unpredictable 
process, as it emerges in the world at different times and follows diverse paths, which can, but 
do not necessarily have to, result in a democratic consolidation. According to Juan Linz 
and Alfred Stepan (1996), democracy becomes the only game in town when the following 
five interactive arenas are in place: “a lively civil society, a relatively autonomous political 
society, a rule of law, a usable state, and an economic society” (p. XIV). Furthermore, the 
 
2 In Democracy and Its Critics (1989, p. 37-38), Robert Dahl lists the following criteria as conditions to reach 
the ideal of democracy: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda 
and the inclusion of adults. 
3 In his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Huntington distinguishes three 
waves of democratization: the first "slow" wave of the 19th century, a second wave after World War II, and 
a third wave beginning in the mid-1970s in South Europe, then Latin America and Asia. 




comparatists consider other seven independent generic variables: two “macrovariables” 
of prior regime type and stateness, two actor-centered referring to the leadership of the pre-
transition regime and during the transition, and three context-centered concerning 
the international influence, the impact of political economy, and constitution-making 
environments. Considering the reversibility of the transition process, some theorists question 
the adequacy of consolidation as a concept. Nevertheless, the leading scholars in the field 
of democratic studies, Donald L. Horowitz and Larry Diamond (2014, p. 94), acknowledge it 
as a category of though representing “the crossing of some threshold of stability, of solidity, 
of consensus”.  
2.2 The Transition Paradigm and its Critics 
With the “third wave” of democratization, a global trend “away from dictatorial rule 
toward more liberal and often more democratic governance” (Carothers, 2002, p. 5) affecting 
seven different regions of the world4, many scholars from the fields of political science, 
economics, sociology, and anthropology, strived to answer the genetic question of democracy 
identifying conditions that both enable and preserve the regime. While some explained the 
political system changes as a result of social and economic development (S. M. Lipset’s 
theory of modernization), others stressed the need for particular psychological attitudes 
in citizens (E. Barker’s “Agreement to Differ”) or analyzed the social structures (A. Gidden’s 
structuration theory). With his renowned essay, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward 
a Dynamic Model” (1970), Dankwart Rustow, the German professor of political science and 
sociology, broke from the predominant schools, criticizing their methodological shortcomings 
and introducing a new model of transitions to democracy. When it comes to methodology, 
Rustow emphasizes distinguishing between genesis and function, as well as correlation and 
causation in the explanations of democracy. Consisting of preparatory, decision and 
habituation phases, his transition model recognizes a single background condition, national 
unity. Thus, Rustow rejects other often proposed preconditions of democracy, “e.g. high 
levels of economic and social development or a prior consensus either on fundamentals 
 
4 In his essay “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Carothers (2002, p. 5) identifies the following trends: 
“1) the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s; 2) the replacement 
of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments across Latin America from the late 1970s through the 
late 1980s; 3) the decline of authoritarian rule in parts of East and South Asia starting in the mid-1980s; 
4) the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s; 5) the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet republics in 1991; 6) the decline of one-party regimes in many 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the 1990s; and 7) a weak but recognizable liberalizing trend 
in some Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s.” 




or on the rules” (p. 362). Based on the democratization framework put forward by Rustow, 
a “loosely related body of diverse literature” developed, entitled transitology (Gans-Morse, 
p. 322).  
Early transitologists, such as O'Donnell5 and Schmitter (1986), produced their transition 
models on the cases of democratizing regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America. In their 
four volume seminal work Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies, they draw a distinction between liberalization and democratization, 
dividing the democratization process in two phases, the transition itself and consolidation. 
Like Rustow, the comparatists stress the “no preconditions” perspective and the role of elite 
bargaining, while downplaying the importance of civil society and international actors. 
Including the transitioning Eastern European regimes in his article Democracy and the 
Market; Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (1991), Adam 
Przeworski accentuates that the process of liberalization does not always grow into the phase 
of democratization, and thus can easily be reversed. Nonetheless, the so called “transition 
paradigm” developed by the above mentioned scholars, has been deemed inapplicable to post-
communist studies by many critics for its limitedness to a specific region and period, hence 
inadequate variables, and finally its teleological tendency characterized by a linear historical 
progression towards a single endpoint. Considering the importance of international factors 
and mass protests in the post-communist transitions, but especially the overall diversity of the 
democratizing regions when it comes to historical legacies, ethnicity and religion, most 
scholars who decided to construct their research on the transitologist approach often had 
to modify it or combine it with other existing theories in order to accommodate these 
specificities.  
For instance, the British political expert Taras Kuzio (2001) draws attention to the post-
communist uniqueness issue asserting that the early area transitologists were limited to the 
analysis of double transitions of democratization and marketization as in Southern Europe and 
Latin America, while neglecting the problems of stateness and nationality. Consequently, 
he stresses the utmost importance of the two variables for a successful consolidation 
of democracy in the studied region, reconceptualizing the post-communist transitions as triple, 
in Central-Eastern Europe, and even quadruple, in the Soviet successor states. One of the most 
prominent transitologist critics, Thomas Carothers (2002), questions the universal transition 
 
5 Guillermo O'Donnell, unlike Philippe C. Schmitter, never considered himself a ‘transitologist’. (Biekart, 2015) 




paradigm all together, deconstructing its five core assumptions while putting forward multiple 
“gray-zone” cases of alleged “transitional” countries that are not in fact in transition 
to democracy, but to other types of hybrid regimes. Addressing the teleological problem, the 
sociologist Paul Blokker (2005) argues to discard the “convergence thesis” of the transition 
paradigm and rather embrace the diversity created by the EU enlargement acknowledging 
there are as many “modernities”, as there are “modernizing agents”. Similarly, the 
anthropologist Manduhai Buyandelgeriyn (2008, p. 236) criticizes the transitologist notion 
of a “single modernity as an objective stage of a unilinear history at which all societies arrive 
at some point through a complete break with the past”, while emphasizing the 
multidimensionality of experiences following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus the 
necessity to consider the specific cultural and historical context of post-communist countries. 
Nevertheless, many transitologists have later on distanced themselves from the simplistic 
and universalistic theories of democratization of the post‐1989 period prompted by the 
Fukuyama's End of History (1989, p. 1) thesis proclaiming “the end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government”. In a 2014 panel discussion (p. 93), Fukuyama himself stated that 
“there’s no reason to think there is a necessary one-way movement of history. All along we 
should have been focusing on the institutionalization of democracy much more than on the 
initial ending of autocracy.” O'Donnell, on the other hand, believed his Transitions work has 
been misinterpreted by critics when it comes to the open-endedness and outcomes of the 
transition process. In his essay “Illusions about Consolidation” (1996, p. 41), he even attacked 
his academic colleagues’ concept of democratic consolidation as teleological and static, 
stressing the importance of “informal institutionalization” of democracy instead: 
Polyarchies are regimes, but not all polyarchies are the same kind of regime. Here we see the ambiguity 
of the assertion made by Juan J. Linz, Adam Przeworski, and others who argue that consolidation occurs 
when democracy becomes ‘the only game in town’… Przeworski argues that democratic consolidation 
occurs ‘when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions’. But this does not preclude the 
possibility that the games played ‘inside’ the democratic institutions are different from the ones dictated 
by their formal rules.  
Based on his broad review of post-communist transition literature, Gans-Morse (2004, p. 338) 
concludes that it is not clear whether the open-ended transformation approach suggested 
by many critics “is a superior theoretical framework to a carefully formulated, closed-ended 
conception of transition”, considering the importance of comparison, and thus the necessity 
of regime ideal types, in understanding diversity. That is why, despite O’Donnell’s critique, 




this research will employ the transition variables as suggested by Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan’s in their study Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America,and Post-Communist Europe (1996). Exceptionally, the comparatists 
managed to incorporate the post-communist cases in the transition literature, while taking into 
account the major issues discussed also by many of the critics listed above, thus creating 
a synthesis of “antecedent regime or legacies approach with that of liberal imperatives” 
(Chessa, 1997, p. 381). 
2.3 Problems of Democracy 
In general, transitologists6 agree that a successful transition does not rule out the 
possibility of a future regime breakdown. However, such a reversal, Linz and Stepan (1996, 
p. 6) claim, “would not be related to weaknesses or problems specific to the historic process 
of democratic consolidation per se, but to a new dynamic in which the democratic regime 
cannot solve a set of problems, a nondemocratic alternative gains significant supporters, and 
former democratic regime loyalists begin to behave in a constitutionally disloyal or semiloyal 
manner.” In this regard many recent critics disagree, demanding the joining of the democratic 
transition and democratic breakdown literatures, as the processes of democratization and de-
democratization are two sides of the same coin. In fact, as early as in 1997, Fareed Zakaria 
warned against the rise of illiberal democracy. Despite the third wave of democratization, half 
of the transitioning countries failed to grow into liberal democracies, emphasizing the 
minimalist election-centered definition of democracy: “(…) without a background 
in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy in divided societies has actually 
fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war.” (p. 35) In this sense, Zakaria argues, the 
Central European countries were more successful thanks to their historical experience with 
liberalism. Overall, the author underlines the need for the basic tenants of liberal governance, 
respect for the civil rights and the rule of law, which alone can keep democracy in check, and 
hence prevent the usurpation of power by demagogues.  
 
6 Compare with Gans-Morse (2004, p. 336): “Scholars of post-communist regime change on average have been 
remarkably cautious, if not downright pessimistic, with regard to their predictions concerning the prospects 
of democracy and capitalism in the post-communist region. They have recognized the possibility of multiple 
outcomes of transition, including the revival of authoritarianism, new forms of hybrid regimes, or some entirely 
unpredictable turn of events.” 
 




Many famous thinkers since Classical antiquity alerted against the potentially dangerous 
nature of democracy as a form of government. That is why a series of documents such as the 
American Constitution or the Helsinki Final Act were drafted to codify certain “unalienable” 
human rights, and thus regulate democracies. In his famous book entitled Democracy 
in America (1835), Alexis Tocqueville, besides listing the advantages of democracy, also 
discusses some of the problems which may arise from democratic rule. Firstly, he warns 
against the tyranny of the majority: “the very essence of democratic governments is that the 
dominion of the majority be absolute; for, in democracies, nothing outside of the majority can 
offer resistance.” (2010, p. 403) John Stuart Mill echoes his preoccupation about direct 
democracy in his book On Liberty (1859, p. 8):  
The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part 
of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; 
the people, consequently may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed 
against this as against any other abuse of power. 
Furthermore, both authors agree that democracy may produce ineffective government due to 
fragmented political parties, incompetent leaders, and thus inefficient policies. Finally, they 
consider negative effects of the masses on culture and morals of the society. Moreover, 
at times the unidentifiable governing mass denominated “the people”, can easily give way to 
demagogy embodied by populist politicians, but also to authoritarianism masked 
as democracy. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is a great example of both problems of democracy, 
as his speeches “envisioning an ‘illiberal state’ show precisely how illiberal actors can ‘think, 
speak, and act outside …institution seven as they are inside them’ and in so doing change 
those institutions” (Dawson & Hanley, p. 715). 
Even in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which Zakaria called successful 
in introducing liberal democracy, “malaise about democracy became the dominant mood (…) 
with a populist turn and growing Euroscepticism”, the Hungarian Professor Attila Ágh argues 
(2016, p. 13). In fact, as there was a positive scholarly consensus about the region’s 
exemplary democratic consolidation in the 90s, today there is a growing negative consensus 
that democracies across the region are “in decline and some might be ‘backsliding’ towards 
semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes or even full authoritarianism” according to Licia Cianetti 
and Seán Hanley (2020). Consequently, the once model democratizers, Hungary and Poland, 
are now treated as model democratic backsliders. In this sense, the authors discourage 
scholars from perceiving the whole region through the same lens, and thus falling into the trap 




of a “reverse transition paradigm”. In an earlier essay, the authors together with James 
Dawson (2018, p. 245) also denounce this tendency, advancing that only a few scholars offer 
“a coherent comparative perspective” of diverse causes for democratic decline across the 
region. As for the temporal frame of the democratic change in the CEE region, Ágh asserts 
that consolidation, the key transitologist term of the 1990s, has been replaced 
by deconsolidation/decline/backsliding in the 2010s. In addition, he claims that the process 
of deconsolidation in the region has begun already under the Old World Order in early 90s 
owing to the “contrast between the presence of formal-legal democratization and the lack 
of social consolidation” (p. 13) boosted by the triple crises7. Under the New World Order, the 
process of deconsolidation in the CEE region was only sped up by the changes in global 
security and economy, and the emerging EU’s geopolitical crisis. Enhanced by the Refugee 
crisis, the sweeping victory of populism in the Visegrád countries, facilitated the formulation 
of a common agenda and thus enabled the emergence of V4 as a collective regional actor 
within the EU in 2016 (Koß & Séville, 2020). This so called “unholy alliance”, overstressing 
national sovereignty while opposing mainstream EU policies, has changed its strategy from 
the “return to Europe” to a “return to the past” (Ágh, 2016, p. 25). 
2.3.1 Democratic Backsliding 
As mentioned above, the concept of democratic backsliding is increasingly used when 
referring to the deteriorating democratic regimes across the globe, and of course in the CEE 
region. In their article, Licia Cianetti and Seán Hanley (2020) affirm that the interest in the 
phenomenon has “exploded” among scholars in the past decade, reaching almost thousand 
Google search results in 2018. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term backslide 
accordingly: “to lapse morally or in the practice of religion” or subsequently “to revert to 
a worse condition”. Due to the original religious meaning, Cianetti, Dawson and Hanley 
highlight, that the label “democratic backsliding” has been criticized for its “moralistic 
and normative overtones” (2018, p. 253). Also called democratic erosion, the term represents 
a wide range of negative phenomena including multiple processes and agents. More precisely, 
scholars employ this label when investigating “changes in formal or informal institutions that 
move the polity in the direction of a hybrid or authoritarian regime” (Hanley & Vachudova, 
2018, p. 278). Perceiving democracy as “a collage of institutions” that can be put together 
and taken apart, Nancy Bermeo (2016, p. 14) argues that there has always been democratic 
 
7 The ECE transformation crisis, post-accession adjustment crisis and the crisis over competitiveness due to the 
global fiscal crisis. (Ágh, 2016, p. 15)     




backsliding, it has only become more vague, and therefore more difficult to detect 
by international observers. Consequently, she manifests that following the end of the Cold 
War, open-ended coups d’état were replaced by promissory coups, executive coups 
by executive aggrandizement and election-day vote fraud by longer-term strategic harassment 
and manipulation (p. 6)8. As a result, contemporary democratic backsliding tends to be more 
gradual rather than rapid and radical. Often executed by a democratically elected official, 
it can lead to the weakening of democracy and subsequent formation of a hybrid regime 
or full authoritarianism. On the other hand, Ellen Lust and David Waldner (2015, p. 6) see 
democratic backsliding as changes affecting the three realms of competitive electoral 
procedures, civil and political liberties, and accountability, recognizing without precedent that 
the “apparent setbacks in democratic practices and institutions may ultimately provide context 
or catalysts for further democratization”. Offering a different structural approach to the 
phenomenon than Bermeo, they identify six theory families: political leadership, political 
culture, political institutions, political economy, social structure, and political coalitions, 
and finally, international factors. These families are treated as switches producing changes 
in outcomes including backsliding based on three types of causes: long and short-term, supply 
and demand-side, institutional and systemic. For example, the theory of political leadership 
exemplifies institutional choices of agents that can be considered short-term, directed at the 
supply-side, while the structural theories of political economy influence political outcomes 
systemically both in the short and long-term and are controlled by both the supply 
and demand-sides. Overall, they stress the need to transition from non-testable overly abstract 
theories to specific hypotheses subject to testing, which, in fact, they present in their work 
in great numbers.  
As suggested in the previous chapter, scholars tend to explain the malaise about 
democracy in the Eastern-Central European countries based on the Hungarian and Polish 
playbook: “illiberal populist party winning an absolute parliamentary majority and embarking 
on a conservative-nationalist project, concentrating executive power, stripping away 
or disabling checks and balances, and exerting partisan control over public institutions” 
(Cianetti, Dawson & Hanley, 2018, p. 245). In their recent article, Cianetti and Hanley (2020) 
 
8Promissory coups are temporary and framed as a necessary step toward a new and improved democratic order. 
In executive aggrandizement, elected executives slowly weaken checks and balances, limiting the power 
of opposition. Longer-term strategic harassment and manipulation can consist in hampering media access, using 
government funds for incumbent campaigns, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering voter 
registration, packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favor incumbents, and harassing 
opponents. (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6) 




note that some forms of change in democracies may fit this backsliding model “only 
awkwardly” and the case of the Czech Republic proves their argument. For example, despite 
the similarities in forms of concentrating power, Babiš’s ANO party “lacks a powerful 
narrative of Czech nationalism” compared to Orbán’s Fidesz and Kaczyński’s PiS (Hanley 
& Vachudova, 2018, p. 278). Furthermore, Babiš amassed great political, economic 
and media power as an oligarch before creating the ANO “anti-corruption” party. This shows 
that the “entrenchment of private interests in the state and in party politics” rather than 
a grand nationalist narrative, as well as “political disruption” rather than a transformation 
of existing traditional political parties can represent an alternative route to backsliding 
(Cianetti, Dawson & Hanley, 2018, p. 249). Contrasting the Czech case with the more radical 
Hungarian and Polish cases, Hanley and Vachudova (2018, p. 278) conclude that Babiš “may 
represent a quieter politics of backsliding that is just as consequential in the longer term”. 
Moreover, Cianetti, Dawson and Hanley (2018, p. 251) alert against abusing the label 
of democratic backsliding when studying the (un)democratic changes in the CEE region, 
for “not all forms of destabilization of the status quo necessarily imply backsliding”. 
Distinguishing between illiberal turns and swerves, Bustikova and Guasti (2017), claim that 
with the exception of Hungary, the rest of the V4 countries are not, in fact, experiencing 
backsliding but a series of volatile episodes, so called swerves. Supported by a number 
of factors such as the rise of populism and “uncivil society”, these processes are allegedly 
temporary and reversible, but can grow into illiberal turns under three conditions: “executive 
aggrandizement, contested sovereignty that increases polarization, and dominant party 
winning two consecutive elections” (p. 168). Overall, Cianetti, Dawson and Hanley (2018, 
p. 247) deem backsliding a “problematic” concept, as it is constructed on the assumption 
of a successful democratization based on institutionally-oriented measurements and the 
Copenhagen criteria which often distort the reality of actual democratic progress in the post-
communist region. 
2.3.2 Populism 
The emergence of the phenomenon of democratic backsliding has been associated with 
a “broader global populist trend challenging liberal democracy” (Cianetti, Dawson & Hanley, 
2018, p. 245). Following the Second World War, right-wing authoritarian populism was 
thought to be defeated. However, Timbro’s annual report (2019) documents its continuing rise 




in Europe since the 1980s. Having gained significant support over the past decade9, 
authoritarian populism has become the second biggest ideology in Europe, trumping 
liberalism, equaling social democracy, and challenging conservatism. Nonetheless, the report 
warns against “avantgardes”, comparing the ideology to fascism or communism. Despite 
being fundamentally anti-liberal, it can also be considered fundamentally democratic: 
In essence, populism raises the question of who controls the controllers. As it tends to distrust 
any unelected institution that limits the power of the demos, populism can develop into a form 
of democratic extremism or, better said, of illiberal democracy. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 82) 
Just like democratic backsliding, the term populism creates conceptual confusion as it takes 
on different meanings around the world. In their book entitled Populism: A Very Short 
Introduction (2017, p. 3-4), Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, recapitulate the 
most common six perspectives of the concept, used in diverse academic and geographical 
areas. The popular agency approach views the phenomenon as an overall positive popular 
mobilization force. Laclauan approach goes even further, identifying liberal democracy as the 
problem and populism as the “emancipatory force” towards radical democracy. Next, the 
socioeconomic approach understands populism as an irresponsible policy involving 
“too much redistribution of wealth and government spending”. A recent approach perceives 
populism as a political strategy of a strong charismatic leader, while yet another perspective 
associates the term with a “folkloric style of politics”. Adhering to an ideational approach, 
which combines many of the ideas mentioned above, the authors finally define populism 
followingly: 
(…) a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should 
be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. (p. 6) 
Defined by what it opposes, essentially elitism and pluralism, the authors stress the transitory 
and flexible nature of the phenomenon. Consequently, besides the key aspect of morality, 
populists take advantage of the vagueness of the core concepts: the people, the elite 
and general will10. These terms are further adapted by the populists based on secondary 
criteria such as political power, socioeconomic status, and nationality.  
 
9 Support for left-wing populism grew following the financial crisis, between 2009-2014, especially in Southern 
Europe. While right-wing populism gained strength with the migration crisis, between 2014-2018, particularly 
in the CEE region. (Timbro, 2019) 
10 While the term the people can be understood as sovereign, the common people or as the nation; the elite can 
stand for political establishment, the economic elite, the cultural elite, or the media. General will is best 




Thanks to viewing populism as an ideology, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) manage 
to analyze both the demand and supply side of populist politics. As for the supply side, the 
authors identify three types of populist mobilization: personalist leadership, social movement, 
and political party, while the common model is a “top-down mobilization around a strong 
populist leader” (p. 55). Most often, populist leaders carefully construct their image based 
on an insider-outsider status11 and authenticity, depending on their host ideology and society’s 
political culture. Presenting themselves as the charismatic strong men, vox populi, 
entrepreneurs or ethnic leaders, they often create a sense of crisis to effectively politicize 
certain issues important to the people and neglected by the elite. When analyzing the demand 
for populism, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p. 100) stress the importance of specific 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical context, in which “threats to the very existence of society 
are present”. Accordingly, the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index explains the current rise 
of populism in Europe as fueled by “popular dissatisfaction with elites, immigration 
and supranationalism” (Timbro, 2019, p. 30). On a more theoretical level, Ronald F. Inglehart 
and Pippa Norris (2019), explore the demand side of the phenomenon through the economic 
inequality perspective and the cultural backlash thesis. While the first theory emphasizes 
economic reasons behind the rise of populism, taking into account the winners and losers 
of globalization, the second theory perceives it as a social psychological phenomenon, 
“a silent counter-revolution” (p. 15) of traditionalists against post-materialists. Overall, 
populism may have both positive and negative impact on liberal democracy. Through 
politization, it gives voice to people who feel underrepresented by the elite. However, 
in promoting majority rule without constraints, it can also endanger minority rights. 
Consequently, it also plays a different role in each stage of (de)democratization: acting 
as “a positive force for democracy” in the first stage of liberalization, defending election 
rights during the democratic transition, but opposing the final stage of democratic deepening 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 88). Finally, the governing parties in Poland and Hungary, 
PiS and Fidesz, described as “challengers to the European consensus and politics as usual” 
(Timbro, 2019, p. 8), are great examples of populism’s decisive role in the process of de-
democratization. 
 
expressed through direct democracy and can “legitimize authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on anyone who 
(allegedly) threatens the homogeneity of the people”. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 18) 
11 Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p. 75) define insider-outsiders as “men and women who have never been 
members of the political elite, i.e., the inner circle of the political regime, but have (strong) connections 
to them)”. 





With the goal of finding answers to the recent de-democratization and de-
Europeanization processes in the Czech Republic, and in the CEE region in general, we need 
to analyze the phenomenon within the context of the European integration. Afterall, 
democratization in the countries in question was possible particularly thanks to the EU’s pre-
accession “interest- and incentive-based frameworks” related to the fundamental Copenhagen 
criteria, but also to the more specific EU rules of the acquis. Many scholars, including Linz 
and Stepan (1996), assumed that the leverage created by these conditionalities would produce 
“a cultural lock-in mechanism: over time, actors eventually shift from meeting liberal-
democratic standards because of a rationalist cost–benefit calculus to genuine ‘hearts and 
minds’ commitments based on a logic of appropriateness and identity change” (Dawson 
& Hanley, 2019, p. 712). However, already in the 90s, other academics were wary of the 
over-optimism when it comes to the “automatic effects” of the EU membership, deeming 
impossible the replication of the Western model in the East in such a short period of time due 
to contradictions between political, economic and social transformations.12 Besides the 
positive impact of the EU conditionalities on the new democracies, Ágh (2016, p. 15) draws 
attention to “negative externalities” of EU’s modernizing transnational actions which together 
with the triple crises allegedly exacerbated the internal problems of the triple transition. 
Despite the potential negative side-effects of EU’s actions, many authors view precisely 
“the falling away of EU accession conditionalities and the Union’s subsequent inability 
to sanction backsliding member states” (Cianetti, Dawson, Hanley, 2018, p. 245) as the cause 
of the current backsliding tendency in the region. Taking into account the diverse challenges 
that the democracies in the CEE region face, we will explore the European (dis)integration 
theory of postfunctionalism, developed by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in 2009 with the 
aim of interpreting these new empirical facts escaping the existing theories, namely, 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.  
Rooted in diverse literature, all three schools attempt to explain the course of European 
integration identifying chief actors and suggesting paths of inquiry. While 
in neofunctionalism promoted by Ernst B. Haas, further regional integration is achieved 
though the cooperation and competition of societal actors leading to a spillover of policies, 
 
12 For example, the British-German sociologist, Ralf Dahrendorf (1990), alerted that “political‑legal 
transformation requires about six months while economic transformation takes six years and social 
transformation 60 years”. (Ágh, 2016, p. 12) 




in intergovernmentalism proposed by Stanley Hoffmann and refined by Andrew Moravcsik, 
national governments, respectively their economic and issue-specific interests, determine the 
level and speed of integration. Both theories perceive the future of European integration 
positively, as their key actors are motivated by economic gains. Postfunctionalism, on the 
other hand, “agnostic” about functionality of decision making and its outcomes, draws 
attention to “the disruptive potential of a clash between functional pressures and exclusive 
identity” (Hoogh & Marks, 2019, p. 1116) which may result in constraining European 
integration. Adopting a multi-level governance approach, the postfunctionalist theory 
acknowledges the impact of domestic conflict on the course of European integration. 
Its authors argue that the elite-centered debate over Europe changed with the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1991, when European issues entered the arena of mass politics, and thus public 
opinion became “a field of strategic interaction among party elites in their contest for political 
power” (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 9). Consequently, they analyze the causes and effects 
of this politization, constructing the following model: 
 
Figure 1. A model of domestic politization (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 9) 
Identity, either inclusive or exclusive, having a significant impact on the formation of public 
opinion, becomes the subject of mobilization reflected in the GAL/TAN social dimension 
of party politics. As traditional parties fail to accommodate the pre-material values introduced 
by the European integration within the left/right contestation, Eurosceptic populist tan parties 




cue13 these issues to mass publics that identify as exclusive nationals, thus restraining EU 
treaty bargaining and compromise overall. Accordingly, postfunctionalism calls attention 
to the fact that besides functional and distributional pressures, European integration is driven 
by identity politics.  
The founder of liberal intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik, calls postfunctionalism 
a non-testable theory, claiming that public pressure on the EU remains an “issue-driven 
phenomenon”, while defending the continuation of trend toward transnational 
interdependence and intergovernmental problem-solving (Moravcsik, 2018). In turn, Hooghe 
and Marks discard his critique for downplaying the impact of the rise of migration and 
populism on European integration, stressing, in defense of their theory, that “ideology, 
identity and the desire for self-rule, are no less rational or irrational than the pursuit 
of material self-interest” (2020, p. 506). Borzel and Risse (2017) point to postfunctionalism’s 
inability of explaining the Euro crisis which, unlike the Schengen crisis, resulted 
in a deepening of the integration through supranational delegation, accentuating that inclusive 
national identities can be mobilized too. Despite its critics, the theory of postfunctionalism 
can shed light on the current de-democratization processes taking place in the studied post-
communist region of Central-Eastern Europe. Leaders of all three governing tan parties, 
Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, and ANO in the Czech Republic have been systematically 
utilizing exclusive identity mobilization during their rise to power and in office. Thanks to the 
politization of European issues, they started implementing “executive aggrandizement”, 








13 Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 13) distinguish the following phases of public opinion construction: “priming 
(making a consideration salient), framing (connecting a particular consideration to a political object) and cueing 
(instilling a bias)”. 




3. METHODOLOGICAL OPTIONS 
When it comes to social sciences research of the changes following 1989 in the region 
of Central and Eastern Europe, these have been investigated as part of transitology 
or transition studies, introduced in the theoretical part of my work. According to Petsinis’s 
qualitative study (2010) covering 362 relevant articles published between 1989 and 2009, 
most of the early transitologist literature emerged in the field of political science 
and sociology, employed qualitative methods, and explored predominantly the political side 
of transitions. With the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria and the subsequent accession 
of the post-Communist states to the European Union, the democratization process was 
deemed successful, and thus the focus of social sciences research shifted from the analyses 
of transitions to the integration of the new member states into the European structures. 
In other words, the case studies carried out in the first half of the 1990s preferred rather 
“inward-looking” approaches concentrating on the internal transition processes 
and potentially regional comparisons, while the research in the second half of the 1990s took 
on “macro-level” approaches to assess these developments on a supranational level. Petsinis’s 
work reveals that Czechoslovakia14 and later the Czech Republic has been among the most 
often studied geographic areas with elite-level and institutional politics at the center of most 
early analyses. In the later articles, occupied with the problems of the European integration 
or “reintegration” in sociological context, the country was usually studied together with the 
other Visegrád states and the three Baltic republics as the best EU candidates. Finally, the 
Czech case has been treated as part of the comparative research on “old” and “new” member 
states, and thus the transition studies of the CEE region became integrated into the European 
studies. In line with the developments in the social science research on the Central 
and Eastern European region, my thesis aims to present an analysis of the democracy crisis 
in the Czech Republic anchored in the European studies. However, to contextualize and better 
comprehend the current processes of de-democratization and de-Europeanization, it will also 
shortly assess the processes of democratization within transitology.  
3.1 Research Theory 
As for the choice of a meta-theory, the empirical investigation opts for discourse analysis, 
which was has been one of the preferred theoretical lenses employed by researchers in the 
 
14 Following the Velvet Divorce, ethno-politics became the area of interest in the case of Slovakia, due to the 
anti-Hungariangovernmentof Vladimír Mečiar (Petsinis, 2010, p. 312). 




CEE region, after positivism and constructivism, according to Petsinis’s study. 
The revolutionary theory, which emerged in 1970s as a critical response to mainstream 
theories, combines post-structuralist and post-modernist ideas, and thus offers a new 
analytical perspective on “the more or less sedimented rules and meanings that condition the 
political construction of social, political, and cultural identity” (Torfing, 2005a, p. 153). 
Although the methodological apparatus for the application of discourse analysis in empirical 
studies is yet underdeveloped compared to its theoretical and philosophical scope, the theory 
has already had a great impact on social science research thanks to its cross-disciplinary 
approach combining linguistics with social and political science. Over the many generations 
of discourse theory, scholars progressed towards “a more inclusive and quasi-transcendental 
notion of discourse and towards a broader constructivist notion of power” (Torfing, 2005b, 
p. 9), defended for example by Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Slavoj 
Žižek. With the rejection of the idea of a transcendental center safeguarding Truth or Science, 
omnipresent in the history of Western thought, discourse becomes the only judge of reality. 
Consequently, all meanings and identities are constructed and interpreted through diverse 
discourses subject to specific contexts. As reiterated by Torfing (2005b, p. 14-17), Laclau 
and Mouffe present the following five key arguments about discourse analysis: 
1) A background of historically specific discourses conditions all human action. 
2) Discourse is a result of hegemonic struggles for power through articulation of identity. 
3) The construction of social antagonism implying the exclusion of Otherness is 
essential in the hegemonic articulation of identity to stabilize the discursive system. 
4) Dislocation of a stable hegemonic discourse occurs with the introduction of new 
disruptive events. 
5) With the dislocation, the subject becomes a split subject and might attempt to 
reconstruct full identity though acts of identification, involving social antagonism. 
Considering the phenomena under investigation and the diverse areas of social reality they 
affect, from transition to democracy to democratic backsliding and populism, discourse 
analysis appears as the ideal methodological fit thanks to its cross-disciplinary orientation 
and focus on context and history. In a globalized world of the 21st century full of new threats 
and challenges questions of identity take center stage. That is why, discourse analysis’ focus 
on political formation of identity accompanied by dislocation and social antagonism, might 
illuminate the current illiberal tendencies in the Czech Republic and the region. Afterall, 
the dynamic processes of democratization and de-democratization prove that the end 




of history is not coming any time soon, so we are left with the discursive system which can 
neither reach its “total fixation” to make sense of the ever-changing social reality. 
Consequently, the empirical investigation proposes a two-dimensional discourse analysis 
to illustrate the recent distancing of the Czech Republic from the Acquis Communautaire, 
and generally from its post-1989 official discourse.  
3.2 Research Strategy 
(…) discourse analysts need to be more explicit about what they choose to look for in empirical 
analysis, why they want to look for it, how they are going to do it, and what kind of research results 
they are likely to obtain. 
In this way Torfing (2005a, p. 170) stresses the importance of a research strategy, when 
contemplating on the methodological challenges of discourse analysis in empirical studies. 
This work adopts the interpretation of methods as critical and political rather than scientific 
“hygienizing” devices, according to Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans (2013, p. 18) who 
encourage methodological experimenting in research, a quest for the “messy truth” rather than 
“fragile objectivity”. At the same time, it aims to incorporate the inward-looking and macro-
level approaches subsequently assumed by the transitologist and later European studies with 
the view of achieving a more complex picture of the phenomena under consideration. 
Consequently, the first dimension of the empirical investigation will analyze the changes 
in Czech official discourse(s) on a sub-systemic level, based on qualitative data, e.g. official 
speeches supported by government publications, interviews, tweets and more. The second 
dimension, on the other hand, will present a systemic level analysis of five variables, “arenas 
of democracy” as suggested by Linz and Stepan (1996), comparing quantitative data, 
e.g. rankings of selected indices of democracy. The use of levels of analysis in international 
relations originated from the debate between the atomistic/reductionist and holistic/systemic 
approaches of the behavioral movement in the 50s, focusing their study on parts/components 
or upon the whole/system (Soltani, 2014). Kenneth Waltz (1959) was first to identify three 
levels of analysis, the individual, the unit or state, and the system. Professor J. David Singer 
(1961), on the other hand, considers two levels of analysis, the international system, and the 
national state. While the “most comprehensive” systemic level, permits for more 
generalizations, but often lacks in detail, the national sub-systemic level, allows “significant 
differentiation among our actors”, and hence richer details, but it may lead to over 
differentiation and ethnocentrism hampering comparison.  




To examine the origins and character of democracy crisis in the Czech Republic 
as enunciated in our research question, we shall investigate the changes in the official 
discourse, and thus the political (trans)formation of national identity, through the analysis 
of the most important speeches of the President and the Prime Minister, which represent the 
dominant political forces. When it comes to the selected corpus of texts, we shall analyze 
four discourses in the case of President Zeman: the official Christmas Messages (2018, 2019) 
and his two special addresses to the nation regarding the coronavirus pandemic (2020), 
completed by his significant comments in interviews. As for the Prime Minister Babiš, we 
selected the following four discourses as the most relevant: “Preamble and Key Government 
Priorities” in the Policy Statement of the Government of the Czech Republic (2018), Prime 
Minister’s New Year’s Speech (2020), Prime Minister’s Address to all Citizens (2020) 
and Prime Minister´s Extraordinary Speech (2020) concerning the coronavirus pandemic, 
again completed by his informal Facebook addresses, interviews and especially his book 
What I Dream Of When I Happen to be Sleeping (2017). To characterize the discourse(s) 
and its implications for democracy, we shall focus on the political actors’ rhetorical strategies, 
domestic policy and foreign policy agenda, paying special attention to the above noted Laclau 
and Mouffe’s five key arguments about discourse analysis, particularly the construction 
of social antagonism. Moreover, we shall relate the study of the texts to the theoretical 
insights reviewed in the first part of this research, namely transitology, the concepts 
of democratic backsliding and populism, and postfunctionalism. Before all else, we will 
consider the specific cultural-historical context, particularly the legacy of communism and the 
transition process.  
As for the second dimension of our discourse analysis, we will attempt to answer our 
second research question: which of the five arenas of Czech democracy has been the most 
affected so far by the recent illiberal tendencies. By the five democracy arenas, we intend the 
“interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions” which must exist for a democracy to be 
consolidated according to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, p. 7). As previously mentioned 
in the Concept of Democracy chapter, these include lively and free civil society, autonomous 
and valued political society, rule of law, usable state bureaucracy and institutionalized 
economic society. Employing these arenas as variables of our research, we selected the reports 
of two leading global democracy indexes, the American Freedom House’s Nations 




in Transit15 and the British Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index16. While Freedom 
House’s annual report has been published since 1995 and covers the 29 formerly communist 
countries from Central Europe to Central Asia, the more recent Democracy Index began 
in 2006 and tracks 165 independent states and two territories. Besides their tradition 
and scope of research, both base the rankings on a maximalist definition of democracy, which 
corresponds to our variables, unlike other indexes such as the Polity IV data series. 
Notwithstanding their effort at measuring “thicker” conceptions of democracy, their reports 
are still limited to examining a set of institutions, which can obscure reality about the actual 
quality of the system. Moreover, a certain amount of subjectivity is always inevitable despite 
the strive for scientific rigor, as demonstrates John Högström (2013, p. 53) in his study 
of statistical discrepancies and regional preferences in the three indexes of democracy, 
the EIU, Freedom House, and Polity IV: 
(…) Freedom House strongly favors Western Europe, the EIU favors Asia and strongly disfavors Eastern 
Europe, and Polity IV favors Africa and North and Central America, and strongly disfavors the Middle East 
and Oceania.  
Accordingly, in line with the discourse theory, we will investigate the macro data in the form 
of these selected democracy rankings, not as objective elements, but rather as discursive 







15 Freedom House scores the countries on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the lowest and 7 the highest level 
of democracy, in seven categories: National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Electoral 
Process, Independent Media, Civil Society, Judicial Framework and Independence, and Corruption. The average 
of these scores equals the country’s Democracy Score (translated to a 0—100 scale the Democracy Percentage), 
which determines whether a country is a “consolidated democracy” (5.01-7.00), “semi-consolidated democracy” 
(4.01-5.00) or “transitional/hybrid regime” (3.01-4.00).  
16 Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index considers 60 indicators grouped into five categories, with 
each rating on a 0 to 10 scale: electoral process and pluralism; the functioning of government; political 
participation; political culture; and civil liberties. The average of these categories makes up the overall Index, 
in which each country is classified as one of four types of regime: “full democracy” (8.00-10.00), “flawed 
democracy” (6.00-8.00), “hybrid regime” (4.00-6.00) or “authoritarian regime” (0-4.00). 




4. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
4.1 Historical-Cultural Context 
4.1.1 Czech Identity Post-1989: Totalitarian Legacies, Democratization and Havel 
Czechoslovakia’s transition from communism to democracy in 1989, forming a part 
of the so called “third wave” of democracy, has been widely considered one of the most 
successful examples of democratization in the world. According to the transitologists Linz 
and Stepan (1996), the country’s transition commenced with the collapse of the “frozen” post-
totalitarianism-by-decay. This prior regime type, characterized by party-bureaucratic-
technocratic leadership with geriatric tendencies, de-ideologization and the creation 
of a parallel culture, was in place during the period of “Normalization” since the Warsaw Pact 
invasion in 1968, which gave end to the reforms of the “Prague Spring”. Having lost its 
legitimacy, the regime collapsed with the Velvet Revolution in 1989, prompted by mass 
student demonstrations, and especially international events, from the Gorbachev’ reforms 
of “Perestroika” and “Glasnost” to the Fall of the Berlin Wall, to name a few. 
Notwithstanding the Velvet Divorce, the monoethnic Czech Republic did not face any 
stateness problem, hence representing a “double transition” according to Taras Kuzio (2001, 
p. 174). Overall, the country had good democratization prospects, as it fulfilled 
the preconditions for democracy, such as “relative economic wealth, as well as past 
experience with political pluralism” (Carothers, 2002, p. 16), owing to the exposure 
to democracy and economic growth in the interwar First Republic. Thus, the Czech Republic 
managed to achieve quite quickly the five arenas of democracy, which culminated in the 
country’s (re)integration in the Western structures, the NATO in 1996 and the EU in 2004. 
Today, the Czech Republic classifies as a consolidated democracy in global rankings, 
suggesting that democracy has become “the only game in town”. Nevertheless, the previously 
mentioned recent rise of populism and democratic backsliding in the country embodied in the 
figures of Prime Minister Babiš and President Zeman, make us question the actual degree 
of this consolidation.  
Although significant, Czech historical experience with democracy was rather brief, hence 
we may assert that nor political institutions, nor civil society had time to mature as in long-
standing democracies. First, with the outbreak of the Second World War, the country was 
transformed into a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia administered by the Nazi Germany, 
and later, during the Cold War, upon falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, 




Czechoslovakia lived 41 years under the communist regime, while being occupied by the 
Soviet troops for 21 years. Therefore, we must not neglect the impact of totalitarian and post-
totalitarian legacies on both the system and the citizens’ mentality. The long-term exposure 
to propaganda, all-encompassing control, repression, and persecution, reflected particularly 
in “a subservient political culture” and “a weak civil society” (Klíma, 2015, p. 323). Besides 
the success of the country’s transition to democracy, the process marked by velocity 
and hence the unpreparedness of its actors, also produced shortcomings. According to Janík 
(2010), the political transformation was completed in a year or two, while the transition from 
centrally planned economy to a market economy took the first half of the 90s. The first 
process consisted in the restauration of parliamentary democracy based on the separation 
of powers by abolishing the leading role of the communist party, recreating the multi-party 
system and organizing the first free elections, whereas the second involved privatization 
and restitution. Due to the simultaneousness and interconnectedness of the processes, 
accompanied by a lack of clear legal regulation, the mass privatization generated corruption 
and clientelist structures in the emerging dominant political parties, ODS and ČSSD. 
Accordingly, the political scientist Michal Klíma (2015, p. 324) radically sustains that the 
“privatization and colonization of political parties by non-transparent business” invoked a so-
called “state capture”, thus degrading Czech democracy into a hybrid regime, specifically 
clientelistic or illiberal democracy, a variation of defective democracy, long before the arrival 
of Prime Minister Babiš and President Zeman. Klíma’s argument is in a broader sense 
reiterated by Professor Antoaneta L. Dimitrova (2018, p. 257) in her article, which views 
current backsliding in the CEE region as the outcome of processes of state capture “by rent-
seeking elites united in party ideological or network configurations”. With the widening gap 
between elite and citizens, both indicate that the recent protests and “earthquake elections” 
reflect genuine societal demands for political reform. 
Nonetheless, following the Velvet Revolution, the country adopted a clearly democratic, 
pro-Western discourse, which is still strongly present in the current Concept of the Czech 
Republic’s Foreign Policy17. The official post-1989 discourse was formulated particularly 
 
17 “The starting point for the values espoused by the Czech foreign policy is represented by our pertinence to the 
Euro-Atlantic area, underscored institutionally above all by our membership in the EU and NATO. The values 
underlying Czech foreign policy are entirely consistent with the principles and objectives promoted by the EU 
in its external relations: democracy, rule of law, universality, indivisibility of human rights, respect for human 
dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law. Specifically, Czech foreign policy is based on the legacy of Czech humanist philosophy, especially that 
of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, on the legacy of the current of democratization spearheaded by the Prague Spring 




by the last President of Czechoslovakia (1989-1992) and the first Czech President (1993-
2003), a playwright and former dissident Václav Havel, who emphasized the “Back 
to Europe” strategy and the building of a vibrant civil society throughout his time in office. 
By founding his political philosophy on the search for truth, promoting human rights above 
economic interests in foreign policy, and uniting the Czech society but at the same time 
criticizing it unscrupulously for “racism, chauvinism, exaggerated caution, destruction of the 
environment and local politicians for power-hunger, arrogance, opportunism and more”, 
Havel took up the legacy of Professor Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, the first President 
of Czechoslovakia (Tabery, 2017, p. 153). Afterall, besides defending the basic principles 
of parliamentary democracy, constitutional state and general westward orientation, 
both President-Liberators were “deeply concerned with the moral basis of politics, 
and in particular, the moral basis of their own participation in politics” (Gellner, 1995, p. 45). 
While praising their brave dedication to morality, Ernest Gellner (1995) criticizes Masaryk’s 
and Havel’s “velvet approach” to politics arguing that they took the Czech national motto, 
“Truth Prevails”18, too seriously:  
What had really prevailed in 1989 was consumerism and the all-European endorsement of a system which 
satisfies its imperatives, as against one which conspicuously fails to do so, and is oppressive and sleazy into 
the bargain. Democracy and decency obtained a free ride to victory on the back of the consumerist triumph, 
and while we must be duly and deeply grateful for that, it is dangerous to delude oneself and suppose that 
they owed the victory to their inherent political appeal. 
Furthermore, Václav Havel has also been accused of “apoliticism” and “populism” based 
on his aversion to political parties following the experience with communist party-state rule, 
e.g. the slogan from 1989: “Parties are for party members, the Civic Forum is for everyone”19. 
Although, truth may not always prevail in history, the search for it, embodied in Havel’s 
legacy, surely can give the country and its citizens purpose and direction. 
 
and Charter 77, and on the tradition of promoting human rights as a prerequisite for a dignified existence.” 
(MZV, 2015, p. 3) 
18 The “Truth Prevails” motto, that appears on the standard of the President of the Czech Republic, was derived 
from the proclamations of Jan Hus referring to the theological truth, was adapted by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk 
as an ethical concept and later echoed in Václav Havel's notion of “life in truth” in opposition to the “life in lie” 
referring to the Czech communist regime.   
19 According to Žantovský, Václav Havel was not an apolitical politician, but a non-political one. While 
he refused to identify with a single party or ideology, he was extremely political in his thoughts and values. (Půr, 
M., Jirsa, T., 2020) Thus, he supported the establishment of the party system, the “transformation” of the 
political movement, Civic Forum, into political parties.  




4.1.2 Czech Identity Today: New Challenges and Threats, Zeman and Babiš 
(…) I believe that above all, we alone are the architects of our own destiny, we shall not be saved from 
that by the excuse about the selfishness of the world powers, our geographic size, nor by the reference 
to the centennial fate of balancing between sovereignty and subjugation. (Havel, 1969, p. 473) 
Most leading Czech commentators in the collection of essays, Czechia on a Crossroads 
(2019), see the way out of the current democracy crisis precisely in rediscovering the values 
promoted by Masaryk and Havel, or some new leaders who would promote them, as both 
of which seem to be lacking at present. General Petr Pavel (2019, p. 31) claims, that Czech 
society, like many post-communist societies, has not yet fully understood its role 
in “continual formation and cultivation of democracy”, as it expected, after the transition, fast 
improvement of material and social conditions without any contribution. Similarly, the 
psychiatrist Radkin Honzák (2019, p. 45) points to the Czech historical passivity born from 
handing over control and responsibility to the ruling party: “the dream of a majority of the 
Czech population consisting in the idea of preserving socialist achievements, and at the same 
time the arrival of capitalist level of consumption, did not come true after 1989 – therefore 
shame on Havel and his visions”. However, the dominant political discourse after Havel did 
not favor the cultivation of democratic values, as “politicians with a narrower vision 
of democracy took over” (Pehe, 2018, p. 65). Václav Klaus, who led the privatization process 
after 1989 and founded the ODS party, went down in history as a nationalist conservative 
Eurosceptic president (2003-2013), tapping into the Czech myths of the “Munich Syndrome” 
and the “Hussite stigma” 20. While both concepts have always been driving the Czech political 
debate, the difference between the older reformers, such as Havel, and current Eurosceptics, 
such as Klaus, is that they do not see the threat for Europe in the moral decline, consumerism 
or materialism, but in the “bureaucratic unifying socialism” of the European Union (Beneš, 
2011, p. 186). Klaus’s Euroscepticism culminated in his refusal to sign the Lisbon treaty. 
Among other controversies of his presidency, stands out his demoralizing mass amnesty 
including high-profile corruption cases, or his fierce criticism of environmentalism, the “new 
religion of the West” limiting human freedom, and civil society, “the unelected elites” seeking 
to interfere without mandate in politics. 
 
20 The first myth refers to the Czech geopolitical insecurity and a sense of distrust in the real intentions 
of superpowers flowing from the “Munich Betrayal” or the “Munich Agreement”, when the main European 
powers (France, UK, Italy and Germany) decided about the cession of the Czech part of Sudetenland to Nazi 
Germany without the presence of Czechoslovakia, “about us, without us”. According to the second myth, 
the Czech Republic ought to play the role of a reformer or mentor of the European or world order thanks to its 
unique historical experience and geographical position, in order to preserve European civilization. 




Besides the already mentioned domestic factors, such as the (post)totalitarian 
and transition legacies, and the failure of traditional parties and its leaders, it is important 
to mention other macro-structural conditions which influenced the change in official 
discourse, and thus the current democracy crisis. The Czech society was certainly not immune 
to the polarization prompted by globalization and the emergence of the internet, respectively 
the social media. These growing divisions between the economic winners and losers, 
and ideological GAL and TAN, are further deepened by Russian and Chinese geopolitical 
players ranging a disinformation war on Europe. The most recent Security Information 
Service (BIS) report confirms that Russian and Chinese hybrid activities, attempting 
to weaken Czech democratic system and influence the country’s foreign policy, continue 
to represent a serious security risk. According to the spokesman of BIS, Ladislav Šticha, 
“while the goal of Russia is to get the Czech Republic back into its sphere of influence, 
the Chinese use us as a gateway to the European Union, which means to economic prosperity” 
(ČT24, 2019). Although the Czech Republic has not accepted almost any migrants 
nor experienced terrorist attacks like other European countries, the fear of an invasion of the 
unknown, boosted by the intense politization of the migration and terrorism issues, pervaded 
the population. Instead of trying to reunite the nation under a coherent, long-term program 
ensuring stability and continuity, populists rose to the occasion offering apparently simple 
and quick fixes to the complex new challenges and threats of security, criminality, 
modernization etc., while triggering even more social antagonism on their chase for the 
enemy responsible for the crises. Consequently, thanks to a combination of the above cited 
micro and macro-structural conditions, the populist movement ANO of the billionaire Andrej 
Babiš celebrated a landslide victory in the 2017 parliamentary election21, with almost 30% 
of the vote and 70 seats, and the reelection of President Miloš Zeman with 52% of the vote 
following a tight run-off against his rival Jiří Drahoš, a pro-European academic. Moreover, 
the two leading politicians formed an alliance, which played a significant role in their 
government and reelection success, respectively22. 
According to Tabery (2017), President Miloš Zeman represents “a phenomenon of the 
20th century”, while the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš “a phenomenon of the 21st century”. 
 
21 Besides ANO, two other parties entered the Chamber of Deputies for the first time, the Pirate Party (22 seats), 
focused on transparency and anti-corruption, and SPD (20 seats), concentrated on anti-immigration 
and Euroscepticism. 
22 President Zeman appointed Andrej Babiš twice Prime Minister despite his criminal prosecution and the lack 
of a parliamentary majority. In turn, the Prime Minister officially endorsed the reelection of the President. 




While the former transformed his political career of an intellectual star of the Velvet 
Revolution warning against the dangers of populism23 into that of a populist yearning 
for power and attention, the latter, younger and richer, could be considered his pupil when it 
comes to the lack of vision and greatly emotional populist means of expression 
and government. Unlike their predecessors, Masaryk or Havel, neither of the two presents 
a clear political-ideological orientation, which fits Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2017) definition 
of populism as a thin-centered ideology. Rather, both the Prime-Minister and the President 
claim to represent the general will of the people against the corrupt elite. As the first directly 
elected President in Czech history, Miloš Zeman has taken advantage of the increased 
legitimacy to assume a role of an active political player, stretching, on many occasions, his 
constitutional powers to push his agenda. President’s transgressions, summarized in the 
constitutional complaint filed by the Senate, include attempts to influence court cases, 
appointing governments regardless of the no confidence motion (case of Rusnok and Babiš), 
refusing to appoint (case of Poche) and dismiss (case of Babiš) ministers proposed to him 
by the head of government or disrespecting the official Concept of  of the Czech Republic’s 
Foreign Policy (iRozhlas, 2019). Despite claiming to fight corruption, Andrej Babiš’s time 
in politics has also been filled with controversies followed by mass demonstrations24.  As the 
first criminally prosecuted Prime Minister in Czech history, the billionaire has been 
investigated for the abuse of €2 million in EU subsidies designated for small businesses in the 
construction of his farm and hotel complex “Stork’s Nest” and the related kidnapping of his 
son to Crimea, and last but not least for the conflict of interest25, regarding the EU funding 
of his Agrofert conglomerate, operating agriculture, food, chemicals and mass media26. 
Overall, Andrej Babiš and Miloš Zeman “have the Czech Republic in their power”, as they 
control a decisive part of political, media, business and public sphere, the journalist Pavel Šafr 
 
23 Miloš Zeman, as a deputy in 1992,  proclaimed: “I would like to warn against a generally spread and so to 
speak populist illusion, which rises from the idea, that the voice of the people is the voice of God, and that what 
the Parliament does not fix, citizens do (…) A third of this country’s population is simple-minded. Every seventh 
person is either idiotic, retarded or an alcoholic. About half of the population has a below-average IQ in this 
country. (… These people divide the world – authors’ note) into simple, often opposite elements. Sometimes it is 
called black-and-white thinking.” (Zeman, 1992, as cited in Naxera & Krčál, 2020) 
24 One of the demonstrations calling for the resignation of Babiš and his justice secretary Marie Benešová 
organized by “Million Moments for Democracy” in Letná Park in Prague on 23 June 2019 counted around 250 
thousand people, thus becoming the largest protest since the Velvet Revolution.  
25 The second audit of the European Commission confirmed PM Babiš’ alleged conflict of interest stopping the 
EU subsidies for Agrofert Group until its resolution, which the PM should do “by either selling his business 
interests, stop receiving public subsidies or stepping down from public office”. (European Parliament, 2020) 
26 The MAFRA media group belonging to Agrofert runs, among others, two of the largest Czech newspapers, 
Mladá fronta DNES and Lidové noviny, the online news portals iDNES.cz and Lidovky.cz, and the most popular 
radio station Impuls. 




warns (2019, p. 223). However, besides their similar populist appeal, effective collaboration, 
and executive aggrandizement tendencies, the two politicians differ in their image, rhetoric 
style and even some policy preferences, which shall be explored in further detail through 
the discourse analysis.  
4.2 New Official Discourse(s) 
4.2.1 Rhetorical Strategies 
As mentioned in the Populism chapter, also Miloš Zeman and Andrej Babiš construct 
their populist image based on an insider-outsider status. While the President was clearly 
a political insider already upon his first election, having led the ČSSD party (1993–2001) 
and served as the Prime Minister (1998-2002). After taking time off politics, he returned with 
a new perspective to stand up to the corrupt elite and the others making use of his long-
standing experience and study. Andrej Babiš, on the other hand, built his populist appeal 
on the identity of an outsider with a non-political background, despite his evident past 
involvement with top politicians, including Zeman27, as he allegedly collaborated with 
Czechoslovak secret police and later “his business profited from privatization and state 
agricultural subsidies” (Havlík, 2019, p. 373). Like the President, Andrej Babiš also decided 
to fight the corrupt elite, but as a hard-working self-made businessman promising to “run 
the state like a (family) business”. The respective insider-outsider identities assumed by the 
President and the Prime Minister are reflected in their rhetorical strategies, “that appear 
normal and neutral on the surface but which may in fact be ideological and seek to shape 
the representation of events and persons for particular ends” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 5). 
By exposing these strategies employed in the selected corpus of official discourses, namely 
the lexical choices, overlexicalization, intertextual references, rhetorical tropes, modality, 
and hedging, we seek to understand why and how the President and the Prime Minister use 
language and grammar to assert their authority, influence the audience, and thus push 
a specific agenda. As for the lexical choices determining the genre of communication, both 
the President’s and the Prime Minister’s style could be described as conversational, mixing 
 
27 In 2001, Zeman’s Government decided to privatize Unipetrol to Babiš’s company Agrofert, that got out of the 
contract last minute. This resulted in Zeman’s criticism of Babiš, when the businessman decided to enter politics: 
“As for Mr. Babiš, I was a direct participant in the signing of a treaty with him during the privatization 
of Unipetrol and I declare that Mr. abide by this signed agreement. This for me is a sufficient proof 
of Mr. Babiš’s lack of credibility. Regardless of certain other suspicions, which shall eventually be investigated, 
I hope.” (Zeman, 2011)  




informal and formal lexicons to create an impression of a “dialogue between equals”, thus 
infusing official discourse with a populist voice (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 44-45).  
Nevertheless, Zeman’s vocabulary compared to that of Babiš is quite varied, ranging 
from even vulgar expressions, employed when referring to the others, e. g. “primitive fools” 
(D1), “barking and screeching of our news commentators” (D3) to literary language often 
enriched by metaphors and other tropes, e. g. “We have only one weapon at our disposal since 
the vaccine does not yet exist. A small piece of fabric is that weapon. (…) We called up to 
arms the victor over the first wave of coronavirus. (…) When the dust settles, we will count 
our gains and losses” (D4). Furthermore, the President is known for his love of neologisms, 
with “The Prague Café”28 being the most popular one. Present in almost every analyzed 
discourse, these new terms mostly used to characterize the other, and thus to further divide 
the society, carry a pejorative connotation, e. g. “The Better-People” (D1), “The Climate 
Prophets” (D2) and “The Anti-Mask People” (D4). Besides metaphors and neologisms, 
Zeman often takes advantage of intertextuality to show off his intelligence, and infuse his 
discourse with humor, as his references often entail a satirical undertone. Most often he cites 
the founder and first President of Czechoslovakia Masaryk, thus assuming the authority of the 
well-esteemed professor, e.g. “I would just like to recall two Masaryk’s quotes. First, we 
already have democracy; now we need some democrats. (…) The second quote goes, being 
upset is not a program.” (D1). Overlexicalization is a common repetition tool, which the 
President uses to build up the emotional intensity, even urgency, of the message. In the case 
of the redundant expression “normal citizens” (D1), the ideological content is clear, creating 
the populist opposition to the elite or the other. Throughout his discourses, the President uses 
lowered modality most often, to assert his authority in a sincere and educated way, no matter 
the message. Simultaneously, he thus manages to communicate “a sense of his moral stance, 
giving access to his internal world” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 188). His last discourse is 
more assertive, but still polite sounding, as he uses first person plural imperative (softening 
impact) considering himself one of the addressees of his own appeal. Finally, The President 
uses hedging to a great degree predominantly to structure his discourse to appear detailed, 
precise, and more credible, listing examples and offering extra historical and statistical 
information. Overall, his use of strategies translates into his relation to the audience, which 
comes off as rather superior, as that of a teacher patiently educating students and occasionally 
 
28 “The Prague Café” is a pejorative term, which became popular after Zeman’s 2013 election, referring to 
an indefinite group of city intellectuals which are interested in politics promoting Havel’s truth and love 
philosophy.  




rebuking them, e.g. “Do you know who the parachutists are in this sense? They are people, 
who are thrown on the candidate list from the top.” (D2), “Allow me to remind you 
of a beautiful phrase from Talmud, the one who saved one human life, saved the entire 
humankind” (D4). 
In the case of the Prime Minister, it is important to note that his discourse is determined 
to a great degree by the work of his PR team, as he decided to invest extensively into political 
marketing, employing some of the country’s best experts29. Like Zeman, Babiš combines the 
informal and formal lexicons to approximate the audience, however his colloquial word 
choice is more moderate, e.g. “These show-offs who are supposed to be in quarantine 
and instead are having a beer together at the pub door are not really heroes.” (D7), “We all 
wanted to breathe freely and enjoy summer” (D8). Moreover, in spoken form, the Prime 
Minister often makes grammar mistakes, mispronounces certain words, and invents others, 
as his native language is Slovak, not Czech. When it comes to formal language, Babiš makes 
use of his background, favoring business rhetoric over literary expressions. The empty 
corporate speak, which “serves to conceal where the actual responsibility lies” as it distracts 
us “from the real causes and necessary solutions” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 34), is evident 
in the use of ambiguous expressions related to performance, English words and statistical 
information: “The solution designed in such a way is ineffective (…) the pursuit of six core 
strategic tenets for the development of our country” (D5), “Moody's raised our rating to the 
highest point in history (…) according to the Deloitte Index (…) of the thirty-six countries 
evaluated by the OECD, we are the tenth best” (D6). Also the Prime Minister employs 
rhetorical tropes such as metaphors and similes, however they are more popular and modern 
than those of the President: “Imagine I was Harry Potter and had a magic wand and could 
transform these projects into reality right now. We would immediately become a second 
Switzerland” (D6). Overlexicalization, giving “a sense of over-persuasion and is normally 
evidence that something is problematic or of ideological contention” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, 
p. 37), is utilized in the Prime Minister’s speeches for example to convince the citizens of the 
country’s progress under his Government: 
Can we take joy in the fact that we are so well off? Don't think we are doing well? I do! (…) Yes, 
the Czech Republic is doing well. Very well. (…) Everyone wants to be well off. I don't know anyone who 
doesn't want to be well off. So I wish for YOU, for you to be well off! (D6) 
 
29 Marek Prchal, who is responsible for his social media image and partook in Babiš’s book What I Dream 
Of When I Happen to be Sleeping (2017), Petr Topinka, who invented the main ANO party slogans, 
or Alexander Braun, who prepared the public opinion poll We Want Better Czechia. (Český rozhlas, 2017) 




Intertextuality is present only in one of the analyzed discourses, when Babiš channels 
the authority of Václav Havel, citing his 1992 New Year's speech. However, instead 
of answering the existential question concerned with public discontent despite economic 
growth, the Prime Minister misinterprets it, offering a discourse reminiscent of the 
Normalization period which Havel was in fact caricaturing.30 Babiš asserts his authority 
particularly though modality and hedging, or the lack of the latter. Unlike the President, he 
uses high modality transmitting certainty, confidence and decisiveness: “We want to engage 
in specific action without lengthy and futile debate. (…) We must be more assertive 
in defending our interests in a unifying Europe” (D5). With the first-person plural he often 
includes himself in the appeal making it thus more compelling. He prefers shorter, even 
nominal, sentences to emphasize action, resoluteness, and results, using padding only when 
communicating something unpleasant.  
 
Figure 2. Andrej Babiš thanking his marketing specialist Marek Prchal after ANO’s victory in the 2017 
legislative election (Český rozhlas, 2017) 
 
4.2.2 Domestic Policy 
The centrality of the empty signifiers, the good people against the corrupt elite and the 
others, is evident from the analysis of the linguistic strategies employed in the populist 
discourses of both the President and the Prime Minister. In fact, already in his 2013 
Inauguration Speech, Miloš Zeman declared wanting to be “the voice of the lower ten million 
 
30 The message of the Prime Minister’s New Year’s speech will be further explored in the next chapters 
concerned with the domestic and foreign policy agendas. 




underprivileged citizens, since the privileged ones have acquired their voice, or rather voices, 
already a long time ago.” He reiterated his promise in the 2018 Inauguration Speech:  
(…) without the contact with citizens, the lower ten million if you will, the president is not worthy. 
A president, which considers himself a part of some chosen elite, is simply an ornament on a state building 
nothing more.  
However, his concept of the people is quite exclusive as all the analyzed discourses 
demonstrate, including only his sympathizers. These are referred to as “normal citizens” 
doing “respectable jobs” (D1), who “do not let themselves be manipulated” (D2) specifically 
by the others, that is media, political adversaries, GAL, and civil society. Overall, this diverse 
group is repeatedly described as unsuccessful, clueless, and foolish, simply falling into the 
category of “The Better-People”:  
(…) those who consider themselves better than the rest of us, who keep mentoring us on what to do 
and who regard their views superior to those of others. However, when we look at the structure of the 
“Better-People” community, we can see that, for example, media often consist of commentators who write 
about something else every day whilst understanding nothing. And these people want to advise us. The 
same applies to unsuccessful politicians, of course. (D1) 
To further establish structural oppositions in his speeches the others are collectivized 
or anonymized, while those responding to the will of the people, such as the Government, are 
treated by names and titles. Even in the time of the coronavirus crisis, the President does not 
leave the social antagonism behind, as D3 and D4 show31. The Prime Minister, on the other 
hand, claims that his ANO party32 is here for everyone, which translates in its wide electoral 
base: “But I also want to involve you, all the citizens of our country.” (D6), “I am here 
for each of you at any time.” (D7), “Our government tries to think of all groups of the 
population.” (D8) At the same time, his policies target predominantly the young and the 
elderly, with the latter representing almost half of his voters33. As a unifying characteristic 
of his version of the people, Babiš accentuates the traditional notion of “Czech golden hands” 
 
31 As usual, the President castigated the media and the political opposition, but also regular citizens suffering 
from the crisis. He controversially proclaimed in an interview that unsuccessful entrepreneurs should bankrupt, 
artists should starve to create their best artworks, and the unintelligent Prague elite should educate itself a bit 
reading now that the clubs closed (Zeman, 2020c).   
32 The democratic character of the ANO party has been disputed as Andrej Babiš himself proclaimed 
in an interview for the British newspaper The Financial Times: “The party is connected to my person. The party 
is me.” (Foy, 2016) The fact that Babiš is the undisputed leader and that there is no opposition within his 
movement, has been proven by constant reelections and numerous members quietly leaving after discords 
(Robert Pelikán, Martin Stropnický, Ivan Pilný, Adriana Krnáčová, Karla Šlechtová, Pavel Telička). His most 
loyal collaborators, former Agrofert employees such as Jaroslav Faltýnek or Richard Brabec remain.  
33 Despite initially presenting itself as a center-right party, ANO has attracted particularly in the 2017 legislative 
election the traditional voters of ČSSD and KSČM. Besides his left-wing policies, Babiš gained the support 
of pensioners thanks to his age, simple language and emphasis on topics such as “strong state, effective 
government, partial critique of the post-1989 conditions or cultural conservativeness, for example on the issue 
of migration” (Nádoba, 2019).  




also elaborated in his 2017 book. The Prime Minister accuses the elite and the others, 
consisting of corrupt politicians and media, of leading a gross conspiracy “campaign” 
or “a political process” against his person (Buchert, 2019). Furthermore, he criticizes them 
for spreading negativism and fear among the people:     
I know the opposition says that our national plan is unrealistic. Once again: the same skepticism, 
the negativism at all costs. (…) You often hear in the media that the global economy is cooling down 
and harder times are coming. That we can't manage all these plans. Someone is always trying to drum 
up fear with this. (D6) 
All in all, the Prime Minister’s definition of the people and the elite can be summed up by the 
following statement posted on his Facebook profile before entering politics: “We are 
a talented nation. We are only governed by the inept” (Babiš, 2013).  
The construction of social antagonism also pervades the President’s main agenda, 
as in both of his inaugural speeches he promises to fight the three “islands of deviation”: 
corruption, extremism, and media. Out of the three, Zeman criticizes media the most 
throughout his time in office (Naxera & Krčál, 2020, p. 94-95), for lying and manipulating the 
people (D1, D2, D3). Specifically, he repeatedly warns against the media owned by Zdeněk 
Bakala34, and the businessman himself, who represents the second “island of deviation”, 
corruption. Moreover, he often accuses the public television broadcaster, Česká televize35, 
of bias, of giving unlimited space to NGOs, but censuring him. As the first directly elected 
president, Zeman generally promotes direct democracy, as a way of fighting the corrupt elite 
by giving voice to the good people. That is why he also suggests the direct election of city 
and county representatives (D2), warning against clientelist structures on all political levels: 
“citizens, godfathers do not exist solely at central level, godfathers exist also at regional 
and communal level” (Zeman, 2017). Although civil activity including demonstrations are 
an integral part of democracy, as the society should have the right to express their discontent 
with the government, Zeman believes such behavior is undemocratic (D1, D2), claiming civil 
activists supposedly “cure their inferiority complex” in this way (2018). After participating 
in the elections, which the President considers the most legitimate demonstration of active 
citizenship (D1, D2), people should step aside and let the rules rule. Otherwise they are 
disrespecting the will of the voters. This points to Zeman’s minimalist understanding 
 
34 Zdeněk Bakala, a Czech billionaire investigated for a series of corruption scandals, owns Hospodářské noviny, 
Respekt or Aktuálně.cz. 
35 Zeman has referred to Česká televize pejoratively many times, calling the television station “a food conserve 
with rotten meat” in an interview for Parlamentní Listy (2017) or “a smelly cocktail” in the Barrandov TV show 
Week with the President (2018). 




of democracy. Considering the President’s collaboration with the Prime Minister discussed 
above, Zeman reiterates support for Babiš’s government in all four discourses, agreeing on the 
promotion of digitalization and investment (D1, D2), and defending its COVID-19 measures.  
However, with the Prime Minister’s decreasing popularity due to the mishandling of the 
second wave of the coronavirus, President’s support seems to fade, which is indicated in D4: 
“I fully support the measures of the Government, although I think they could be 
communicated better sometimes”. Some journalists presume that the President even wished 
to replace the PM and put into place a caretaker government headed by the Minister of Health 
Prymula, which resulted in the Minister’s controversial replacement (Švehla, 2020; Dolejší 
& Stuchlíková 2020). 
President Zeman: Domestic Policy Agenda D1 D2 D3 D4 
I represent normal citizens with respectable jobs, who have their own head and do 
not let themselves be manipulated. 
    
Citizens should ignore “The Better People” (the media) because they do not 
understand anything. 
    
It is not democratic to demonstrate against a regime that was democratically elected. 
    
City and county representatives should be elected directly to avoid the formation of 
coalitions against the winner of elections. 
    
Elections are the most important part of democracy. 
    
I support the Government and its vision. 
    
We should not be afraid of digitalization but embrace it as it could help speed up the 
state and thus simplify our lives. 
    
Investments are the future, that is why I support the Government’s long-term plans. 
    
During the coronavirus crisis, it is important not to panic, follow the Government’s 
measures and listen to experts, not fake news. 
    
Figure 3. President’s domestic policy agenda (own table)  
As indicated above, the support of ANO and Andrej Babiš is not clearly conditioned 
by ideology, policy attitudes nor a specific social class. Instead, the Prime Minister offers his 
sympathizers deluded with traditional parties, effective businesslike solutions. The dichotomy 
between the slow party democracy dominated by inexperienced corrupt politicians and the 
more moral and straight-forward world of business the Prime Minister represents, 
summarized in the pre-election slogan of the ANO party, “We are not like politicians, we 
work hard”, is emphasized in all analyzed discourses: “We want to engage in specific action 
without lengthy and futile debate.” (D5), “I will impress upon the ministers to actively work 
with this plan” (D6), “The whole government is working non-stop in every possible way” 
(D7), “we’ve been working round the clock to tackle this unparalleled situation” (D8). 




To achieve greater effectivity, Babiš suggests in his 2017 book and different interviews 
reforms of the Czech constitutional system, which would in fact weaken the separation 
of powers and the system of checks and balances. These include: 
Lowering the number of MPs in the lower chamber to 101 (instead of 200), introducing a first-past-the-post 
electoral system for elections to both chambers of the parliament; eventually abolishing the Senate (the 
upper parliamentary chamber); limiting parliamentary discussion; reducing the number of ministries; 
introducing referenda; abolishing regional administration; directly electing mayors; possibly abolishing 
local councils; and also strengthening the influence of the state on the public media. (Havlík, 2019, p. 380) 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister continually stresses his openness and honesty when it comes 
to keeping promises (D1, D2, D3, D4). To demonstrate these qualities, he regularly posts 
about his hard work on social media, summarizing his weekly achievements in the informal 
video report “Hey, People”. The content of these videos and posts portraying the Prime 
Minister as one of the people36, but also as the one responsible for all the progress, is often 
problematic being taken out of context, incomplete, inconsistent or taking credit for someone 
else’s work. (Tvrdoň, 2019) Despite claiming to have a long-term vision for the Czech 
Republic, Babiš has focused predominantly on short-term populist policies, such 
as discounted train and bus fares for seniors and students, and the increases of pension 
and child benefits, thus keeping his word to invest in people (D5, D6). On the other hand, he 
has neglected the proposed long-term reforms, disinformed about the kilometers of highway 
constructed37, instead of the promised “balanced” government budget increased the deficit, 
among others (Břešťan, 2020). The Government also did not advance digitalization and the 
centralization of state services (D5, D6), as the coronavirus crisis revealed. During 
the pandemic, it repeatedly failed to clearly communicate a concrete plan. Relying on public 
opinion polls rather than specialists, and thus lifting all COVID-19 restrictions, the Czech 
Republic went from being “best in COVID” to one of the most affected countries in the 
world. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister sustained that “nobody could have been prepared for” 




36 Besides presenting the Government’s program, the Prime Minister often mentions his personal life, talking 
of dogs, food, and family, to approximate the citizens.  
37 In his New Year’s speech (D6), the Prime Minister claims: “Since I entered the cabinet, we have opened 91 
kilometers of new motorways and started construction on a further 163 kilometers.” Nevertheless, since 2001, 
70,1 km of new motorways were opened and the construction of a further 113 km was started (Demagog.cz, 
2020). 




Prime Minister Babiš: Domestic Policy Agenda D5 D6 D7 D8 
ANO party/Government is for everyone. I am the ANO party/Government. 
    
We particularly think of our children and seniors. 
    
We are a small nation but with great talent and values. 
    
We invest in people. 
    
We do not just talk about goals like other politicians, but we work hard to achieve 
them. 
    
I am open and honest; we keep our promises.     
We build a lot, and reconstruct. 
    
We support digitalization including centralized governmental services. 
    
We offer a new long-term vision for a prosperous future of the Czech Republic. 
    
We will get through the coronavirus pandemic if we work together and follow the 
Government’s measures. 
    
During the coronavirus crisis, we made some mistakes because we could not be 
ready for this. 
    
Figure 4. Prime Minister’s domestic policy agenda (own table)  
 
4.2.3 Foreign Policy 
For forty years in this day you have heard from the mouths of my predecessors in diverse version the same 
thing. How our country is flourishing, how many other billions of tons of steel we made, how we are all 
happy, how we trust our government and what beautiful perspectives open in front of us. I suppose, you did 
not elect me to his office, so that I too would lie to you. Our country is not flourishing. (…) The worst thing 
is, that we live in a corrupt moral environment. We fell ill morally since we got used to saying one thing 
and thinking another. We learned to believe in nothing, ignore one another, take only care of ourselves. 
(Havel, 1990) 
In this way, President Havel reflects on the situation in Czechoslovakia post-transition in his 
first New Year’s speech, rejecting the lies told by the representatives of the communist regime 
and emphasizing the need of a national moral rebirth. Furthermore, he hopes to reinforce 
the country’s authority in the world through the promotion of humanist values, which still 
form the base of the Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy (2017) as discussed 
in the Historical-Cultural Context chapter. Nevertheless, the analyzed discourses demonstrate 
that both the current Prime Minister and the President do not always act (or speak) 
in compliance with this official conception failing to harmonize the formulation of foreign 
policy even within the political representation, which results in the incoherent 
and unpredictable image of the country in the world. Overall, the discourse analysis reveals 
that the President and the Prime Minister concentrate mostly on domestic issues. In relation 
to NATO and the EU, they politicize predominantly the problem of migration and to a lesser 




degree terrorism and ecology. The promotion of economic diplomacy appears to dominate 
over the protection of human rights and the environment. Both the Prime Minister and the 
President appreciate cooperation with the V4 countries, but their views diverge on the issue 
of the relations with Russia and China. As Vít Borčany e Vít Dostál (2018, p. 13) sum up, 
the Czech foreign policy has been lately characterized by indifference, absence of a long-term 
vision, egoism and even aggression towards other actors: 
Its current creators deepen the Czech self-infatuation, which compromises the possibility to co-create rules 
of the international system and thus take advantage of the benefits the contemporary system brings to the 
smaller countries.  
This tendency is confirmed in the message reiterated in most of the discourses, that the Czech 
Republic is doing better than the rest of the countries, and in the lack of international 
solidarity demonstrated during the migration and coronavirus crises. Due to the preference 
for pragmatism over moral values expressed in both the President and Prime Minister’s 
discourses, various commentators compared the leaders’ rhetoric to that of Gustáv Husák, last 
communist president of Czechoslovakia and the symbol of the Normalization period. 
 Zeman invites the Czech nation to enjoy the current economic growth and leave 
the “bad mood” behind, nevertheless his appeal is relatively more sober than that of the Prime 
Minister, addressing also potential economic problems due to the US-China Trade War, 
Brexit and labor shortage (D1, D2). During the coronavirus pandemic, the President did not 
showcase much international solidarity, portraying the Czech Republic as a country that is not 
doing as bad as the others: “Look at Sweden for example, there are now already over six 
thousand dead and I am not even talking of Israel” (D4), only thanking China for the delivery 
of medic supplies, Czechia in fact purchased: “I would like to thank the People's Republic 
of China, which has as the only country helped in the supply of these resources” (D3). 
Although the Parliament, respectively the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plays the principal role 
in the formulation of foreign policy, the Constitution grants the Head of State instruments 
to significantly influence it38: “I promise to strive to defend the national interests of the Czech 
Republic and its sovereignty in the area of migration as well as other areas. I promise that 
I will continue to support economic diplomacy” (D1). It is questionable whether Zeman’s 
 
38 According to the article 63 of the Constitution, President of the Republic has the power to represent the State 
with respect to other countries, negotiate and ratify international treaties, receive, appoint, and recall heads 
of diplomatic missions. (Ústava ČR, 1993) 




promotion of economic diplomacy particularly with China and Russia39 does not at times 
collide with his promise to defend national interests and security, considering the country’s 
integration in the Euro-Atlantic area. According to Zeman, migration is connected 
to Islamism, hence extremism, his first “island of deviation”, which represents a security 
and an ideological threat. In his 2017 Christmas message the President pleaded NATO to be 
more active in the fight against Islamic terrorism and reproached the EU for not being able 
to protect its borders. He reiterates this message, supporting the NATO mission 
in Afghanistan and complimenting the activity of V4 that stood up to the incapable EU elite: 
“It managed to achieve the almost impossible. It successfully stopped the discussion about the 
nonsensical idea of migrant quotas” (D1). His criticism of the EU in confront with his praise 
of Russia and China, is expressed in the following statement for the Russian NTV40:   
Russia has a strong leader, China has a strong leader, the United States have a strong leader. Please, find 
me a strong leader on the level of the European Union. I look left, I look right, I look straight, I look back 
— I simply do not see a strong leader. (Malát, 2018)  
 
 
Figure 5. Miloš Zeman drinking a beer with Xi Jinping in Prague (AMO, 2016) 
 
When it comes to China, Zeman hoped the Czech Republic would become “an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier of Chinese investment expansion” in Europe, paying multiple visits to the 
country, inviting the Chinese president Xi Jinping for the first time to Prague in 2016 despite 
 
39 Zeman’s promotion of business deals with China and Russia is linked to the interests of the President’s 
controversial collaborators without security clearance, Chancellor Vratislav Mynář, and Martin Nejedlý 
connected to the Russian energy company Lukoil. Moreover, Jaroslav Tvrdík and Petr Kellner lobby for the 
Czech-Chinese relations.  
40 In the same interview the President confirmed his opposition to the EU sanctions against Russia, as he had 
proclaimed the annexation of Crimea fait accompli. 




public protests, and even appointing the chairman of CEFC Ye Jianming41 his honorary 
economic adviser (Barbosa, Santora & Stevenson, 2018). Although most of the promised 
Chinese investments did not materialize, President continues to defend Chinese interests, 
ridiculing the BIS reports warning of Chinese espionage through the Huawei Technologies: 
“the Chinese do carry out industrial espionage here. They come to the Czech Republic to 
investigate why our trains are so slow while theirs run at 300 km an hour” (D1).42 Finally, as 
his predecessor Klaus, Zeman is skeptical about global warming. He dismisses the European 
Green Deal as ideological and hurtful to economics, considering that the Czech Republic is 
still quite dependent on traditional energy sources (D2). 
President Zeman: Foreign Policy Agenda D1 D2 D3 D4 
We should rejoice from current economic growth but beware of potential problems.     
I will defend national interests and sovereignty, and economic diplomacy. 
    
NATO should continue to fight Islamic terrorism and EU should protect its borders. 
Thanks to the V4, the migrant quotas were rejected. 
    
We should not accuse the Chinese of spying, but learn from them, as they are more 
technologically advanced. We should be grateful to China for their help during the 
coronavirus pandemic. 
    
The human impact on climate change is overrated, discussions of climate change are 
exaggerated and dangerous for the economy of the Czech Republic and the EU. 
    
During the coronavirus crisis, other countries are doing worse than us and we should 
be grateful to China for their help. 
    
Figure 6. President’s foreign policy agenda (own table)  
In all four analyzed discourses, even during the coronavirus pandemic, the Prime 
Minister aims to convince the citizens that the country is and will keep doing extremely well, 
particularly thanks to his Government:  
We want to (…) do everything we can to improve our lot. (D5); We have an amazing time before us. We 
are the Czech Republic, a country for the future. (D6); We are doing very well. And I am sure we will see 
this through. (D7); We saved thousands of lives. That is why we coped with the first wave so well. (D8)  
This is consistent with his populist appeal built on competence, not ideology. Despite the 
favorable economic situation in Europe which influenced the growth of economy, the Babiš’s 
Government has increased its spending which cumulated in the highest deficit during the 
coronavirus pandemic. To further persuade the public of the Government’s achievements, 
 
41 CEFC gained shares in several important Czech companies including the Lobkowicz Group, Travel Service, 
Médea Group, Empresa Media and bought the Slavia football club. Ye Jianming was arrested in China in 2018 
and his company’s investments were moved to the state CITIC Group. 
42 Despite the security threat, Zeman is also pushing the construction of a new unit at the nuclear power plant 
Dukovany by the Russian Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation, which lately led to the cooling of relations 
with the Prime Minister. 




Babiš often stresses the exceptionality of the Czech Republic regarding security, economic 
performance, and the reaction to the coronavirus crisis, in relation to other countries:  
Our citizens live in a safe country, a blessing bestowed on few of the nations around us. (D5); We are 
growing. We are getting richer. More than most eurozone and European Union countries (D6); We are one 
of the few countries that did not miss the right moment to put in place strict measures to prevent the 
unrestrained spread of the disease. (D7); That was after we became one of the first countries in Europe 
to stop the spread of the disease. (D8)      
Although the Czech Republic is one of the safest countries in the world, as the Prime Minister 
himself claims, national security and the rejection of migrant quotas become top priorities 
of his Government (D5, D6). This agenda is also reflected in Babiš’s relationship with the 
European Union. Together with the V4 countries, he promotes Better Europe over More 
Europe, stressing strong Member States and depoliticization of the European Commission, 
the preservation of Schengen and protection of external borders. Although the country has 
fulfilled the criteria for joining the eurozone43, Babiš chooses to wait until the EU reforms 
(D5). Even though the Prime Minister presents himself as a more pro-European than 
the President, his rhetoric in fact encourages Euroscepticism44, fighting for membership 
benefits without responsibility-sharing: 
One of this Government’s headline objectives is to fight for Czech citizens’ interests within the European 
Union (…) We must be more assertive in defending our interests in a unifying Europe. (…) We do not 
simply want to nod to Brussels, we want to change its policies. (D5); Our government confidently 
represents our country abroad. At the UN and in Brussels at the European Council (…) where I fight hard 
for Czech interests. (D6) 
Unlike Zeman, Babiš acknowledges the importance of climate change but argues that every 
country should device their energy mix, stressing the importance of nuclear energy 
in achieving carbon neutrality in the Czech Republic45 (D5, D6). Overall, the Prime Minister 
wants the Czech Republic to be “seen” in Europe, however, currently his previously 
mentioned conflict of interest is the most visible. 
 
43 According to the annual report Evaluation of Fulfillment of the Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Degree 
of Economic Convergence of the Czech Republic with the Euro Area by the Ministry Finance and CNB (2018), 
the Czech Republic currently meets the public finance, interest rate convergence and price stability criteria. 
Nevertheless, the process of real economic convergence remains unfinished, as the local price and wage levels 
are still substantially below the older EU member states.  
44 In the analyzed discourses addressed to the Czech citizens, Brussels is painted almost in opposition to the 
Czech Republic and its interests, however in other speeches particularly at conferences, the Prime Minister 
acknowledges the Czech co-creation of Brussels policies and the importance of the membership: “I don’t know 
what they mean, who is this Brussels, because we are part of this Brussels. (…) We are definitely not losing 
national sovereignty (…) I think it is useless to talk of how positive our membership in the European Union has 
been during those 15 years.” (Babiš, 2019) 
45 When it comes to climate change, the Prime Minister’s attitude is also unclear, as he defends the European 
Green Deal at diverse conferences and in the EU but presents a much more of a skeptical view to the citizens: 
“I expect that Brussels will finally forget those green deals, which ruined our automotive industry or ruined the 
economics, those emission permits.” (Honzejk, 2020) 




Prime Minister Babiš: Foreign Policy Agenda D5 D6 D7 D8 
The country is doing extremely well, and it will be doing even better. 
    
We are doing better than other countries of the EU.     
National security and the rejection of the migration quotas are our top priorities. 
    
We fight actively for national interests abroad, in the European Union.     
We promote ecological policies. 
    
Figure 7. Prime Minister’s foreign policy agenda (own table)  
 
4.3 Impact of the New Discourse on the Arenas of Democracy 
The change in official discourse characterized by illiberal tendencies indicated in the 
analysis of the President and Prime Minister’s speeches influenced the position of the Czech 
Republic in international democracy rankings. Since its origin in 2006, the Democracy Index 
compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit has categorized the Czech Republic as a full 
democracy achieving generally an overall score of 8.19/10. After 2013, coinciding with the 
election of Miloš Zeman President and the entrance of Andrej Babiš and his ANO party into 
politics, the country’s ranking started dropping progressively, being demoted to a flawed 
democracy by 2014 and reaching the lowest score of 7.69/10 in the most recent 2019 index. 
Nevertheless, ranking 32nd in the world, Czechia is still doing better than the rest of the 
Central European region, with Slovakia taking 42nd, Hungary 55th, and Poland 57th place. 
With the sum of 5.64/7 points, the Czech Republic followed by Slovakia, is still classified 
as a consolidated democracy in the most recent Freedom House report. However, both 
countries are almost approaching the semi-consolidated democracy category to which the 
neighboring Poland has already been downgraded, with Hungary having declined to 
a transitional or hybrid regime. Similarly, as the Democracy Index, also the Nations in Transit 
detect a decrease in the Czech Republic’s democracy score following 2013, with a further 
drop after 2017. While both analyzed indices demonstrate that the Czech Republic is still 
doing better than its neighbors, it is a question whether the country will not follow down their 
path, considering the declining tendency of its democracy score since 2013. Nevertheless, 
despite the regional proximity and similar historical development, we must not neglect the 
significant differences in Poland and Hungary’s prior regime type and democratization, which 
unlike Czechoslovakia underwent a negotiated transition from an authoritarian communism 
in the case of the former and from mature post-totalitarianism in case of the latter (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996), and consequently the specific character of their current de-democratization 




processes, particularly when it comes to the role of the religion in both of the national-
conservative right-wing ideologies.   
 
Figure 8. EIU’s Democracy Index scores of the Central European countries (own table)46 
 
Figure 9. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit scores of the Central European countries (own table)47 
 
46 Scores since 2006, when the Index was first published, with updates for 2008, 2010 and later years, retrieved 
from the most recent EIU’s Democracy Index report (2019).  
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In the analyzed years coinciding with Miloš Zeman’s presidency and Andrej Babiš’s 
accession to power, Democracy Index records a decrease in civil liberties, but also in the 
functioning of government. This decline points to the Prime Minister’s conflict of interests 
and issues with the formation of government. Furthermore, the scores reveal two constants, 
an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation, weaknesses 
common for all the Eastern and Central European democracies. These aspects of democracy 
are continuously undermined by political instability and corruption scandals, which contribute 
to the decreasing popular faith in the political class and democracy overall. Moreover, illiberal 
political discourse and the politization of issues such as migration and terrorism encourage 
xenophobia and even racism in the population. The most recent EIU’s Democracy Index 
report adds that many CEE countries reject “liberal” democratic values giving preference 
to “strongmen” who bypass political institutions (2019, p. 17). Despite problems with media 
freedom suggested in the decline in civil liberties, the Czech Republic continues to have free 
and fair elections, which the high numbers regarding electoral process and pluralism confirm.  
 
Figure 10. EIU’s Democracy Index scores of the Czech democracy arenas (own table)48 
 
47 Scores since 2015, when Freedom House reversed its methodology (before rating 1 represented the highest 
level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest), retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit. 
48 Table created based on the data available in the yearly EIU’s Democracy Index reports. The graph shows the 
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When it comes to the Freedom House’s Nations in Transit reports, these tell a similar story. 
Electoral process rates highest, followed by local democratic governance, judicial framework 
and independence, and civil society. Nevertheless, as in the EIU’s Democracy Index, civil 
society suffers a decline in 2017 due to the impact of illiberal and far-right groups on the 
public discourse. Also the score of independent media, which has been low since 2014, when 
Babiš entered in office as Minister of Finance, decreased even more in 2020 to reflect the 
growing oligarchs’ influence in the sector49 and the continued attacks on the public 
broadcaster Česká televize. What more, Freedom House registered attempts at executive 
interference with the rule of law, specifically around the fraud investigation of the Prime 
Minister, which is manifested in the most recent judicial framework and independence score 
decline. Like the Democracy Index, also Freedom House indicates issues with government 
instability as the consistently low national democratic governance and corruption score show.  
 
Figure 11. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit scores of the Czech democracy arenas (own table)50 
The diverse aspects of democracy rated by the examined indices could be translated into 
the five major arenas of a modern consolidated democracy introduced by Linz and Stepan 
(1996), consisting of civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic 
 
49 Freedom House refers to the already mentioned Babiš’s ownership of the country’s largest newspapers Mladá 
fronta DNES and Lidové noviny, but also to the recent acquisition of the largest Czech commercial broadcaster, 
TV NOVA, by the PPF group, owned by the wealthiest Czech entrepreneur, Petr Kellner. 
50 Table created based on the data available at the Freedom House Nations in Transit website. The graph shows 
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society. Considering the recent developments reflected in the rankings, we can conclude that 
the arena of political society has been affected the most thus far. Despite the preservation 
of free and inclusive electoral contestation, there is an evident lack of effective political 
leadership and a stable party system upholding democratic values. Due to clientelist 
structures, the gap between citizens and the political elite widened enabling the rise 
of populism and creating governmental instability. The emergent populist discourse has had 
a deteriorating effect on another arena, the civil society, which shows the problem 
of complementarity as “one of these two dimensions is frequently neglected in favor of the 
other” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 9). In fact, leaders such as Zeman and Babiš discredit 
the political elite promoting strongman leadership and majoritarian democracy. At the same 
time, they condemn critical civil society actors, particularly media and NGOs, as unelected 
elite, contributing to their decreasing public legitimacy. Through the mobilization of exclusive 
national identity, boosted by the ownership of important media outlets, they manage the win 
over a part of the public opinion. Nevertheless, the civil opposition remains strong, which was 
manifested in a series of successful demonstrations against the illiberal tendencies, with one 
“Million Moments for Democracy” protest becoming the largest since the Velvet Revolution. 
Neither the rule of law arena has been left intact, as the leading political actors attempt 
to disrespect the Constitution, however, unlike in the neighboring Poland or Hungary, 
constitutional changes have so far remained discursive. Although the Czech Republic is not 
experiencing stateness problems like other post-communist countries, the obsolete, slow, 
excessive state apparatus favoring corruption complicates both the governance and the lives 
of citizens, as the coronavirus pandemic uncovered. Finally, as “no single arena in such 
a system can function properly without some support from one, or often all, of the other 
arenas” (1996, p. 13), also the autonomy and competitiveness of economic society arena, 
which has been the emblem of transition success, has suffered from the accumulation 










5. CONCLUSION: WILL “TRUTH PREVAIL” OVER THE ILLIBERAL 
CHALLENGE? 
How we conceptualize democracy, favoring either minimalist or maximalist definitions, 
conditions how we explain a successful democratization or democratic backsliding. 
The theoretical part of this work demonstrated that democracy is a complex concept, difficult 
to define or measure, taking into account all its diverse subtypes. We adhere to the definition 
of Western democracy founded on the principles of constitutional liberalism. Without 
the respect of the rule of law and civil rights, democracy is reduced to its electoral 
characteristics risking “the tyranny of the majority”. Moreover, we must understand 
democratization and de-democratization as dynamic processes, for many countries today 
remain in the “gray zone”, and even consolidated democracies run the risk of reversal. 
The prototypical CEE backsliders, Poland, and Hungary, manifest that illiberalism can grow 
even inside a “successfully” institutionalized democracy. At the same time, we need not 
to reject all theoretical categories of though such as transition models, regime ideal-types 
or the democratic consolidation concept because of teleology, instead we may critically 
employ them as a framework that can help us organize the complex reality. Afterall, the limits 
of the early transitologist comparativist transition paradigms have been discussed extensively 
leading to a consensus among the transitologists themselves that rejects the idea of a single 
modernity emphasizing rather the formal and informal institutionalization of democracy. 
Furthermore, the uniqueness of the post-communist transitions revealed the relevance 
of preconditions for democracy, and particularly importance of historical-cultural context. 
Similarly, we cannot fall into the trap of a “reverse transition paradigm” when analyzing 
the recent democratic decline in the CEE region, acknowledging the countries’ diversity. 
Despite its recent popularity, democratic backsliding is not a new phenomenon having only 
become vaguer and more gradual. This illiberal process has been associated with the rise 
of populism, both anti-liberal and democratic thin-centered ideology based on the antagonism 
of “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”. As the EU conditionalities significantly 
impacted democratization in the post-communist countries, postfunctionalism sustains that the 
current (de)democratization processes in these now member states can negatively influence 
the course of the European integration owing to the clash between functional pressures 
and exclusive identity. 
Thanks to its post-structuralist cross-disciplinary context-focused approach, the present 
investigation opted for a two-dimensional sub-systemic and systemic-level discourse analysis 




to illuminate the recent distancing of the Czech Republic from the Acquis Communautaire, 
and generally from the country’s post-1989 official discourse. The incursion into 
the historical-cultural context revealed that the democracy decline in the Czech Republic is 
certainly not an isolated phenomenon, having been influenced by macro-structural conditions 
such as geopolitical changes, globalization, the development of the internet and social media, 
and the consequent disinformation campaigns, along with a series of external crises such 
as terrorist attacks, economic crises, the migrant crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Consequently, the Czech populist leaders, similarly as their international counterparts, take 
advantage of the economic inequality, winners and losers of the globalization, and cultural 
backlash, GAL/TAN divide, created by these global trends. Although their populist appeal 
and their executive aggrandizement tendencies appear similar from the outside, there are 
fundamental differences in their narrative owing to specific regional and domestic 
experiences. Unlike its neighbors, Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia transitioned from the 
“frozen” post-totalitarianism-by-decay to democracy abruptly, through collapse after a series 
of mass demonstrations, and crucial international events. Václav Havel’s humanist program 
inspired by Tomáš G. Masaryk and his search for truth, along with the “Back to Europe” 
strategy shaped the Czech national discourse post-1989. Thus, also thanks to 
the preconditions for democracy, the country achieved consolidation quickly, which 
culminated in its integration in NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, the negative legacies 
of (post)totalitarianism reflected in a weak civil society and subservient political culture, 
coupled with the shortcomings of the transition, particularly the unregulated mass 
privatization, led to the spread of corruption and clientelist structures within the new political 
parties, alimenting a growing gap between the elite and citizens. Thus, the rise of the populist 
Andrej Babiš and Miloš Zeman should be understood as a consequence of all these 
developments, rather than the origin of the democracy crisis, which leads us to question 
the effective institutionalization of Czech democracy in the first place. 
As for the character of the illiberal challenge, President Zeman works with the identity 
of an insider, whose age, studies, and experience in politics allow him to lecture the audience, 
employing a wide range of literary tropes and intertextuality, referencing for example 
Professor Masaryk. To assert his teacher-like authority in a non-superior way, he 
approximates the audience mixing in informal expressions, using lowered modality and the 
first person imperative. The Prime Minister’s outsider identity of a hard-working 
businessman, product of the country’s best marketing, is sustained by his empty corporate 




speak consisting of English terms and statistics to designate performance, but also simple 
colloquial expressions creating the impression of “a dialogue between equals”, and finally 
high modality verbs and short nominal sentences indicating confidence and action. Both 
political leaders claim to defend the will of common working people against the corrupt elite, 
represented by their political opponents and the media, occasionally immigrants and Brussels, 
(in case of the President) GAL, and civil society. Except for the politization of security, 
migration and to a lesser degree ecology issues, their discourses are predominantly concerned 
with domestic policy, referencing other countries to illustrate how well the Czech Republic is 
doing in comparison. Due to the President’s controversial promotion of Russian and Chinese 
interests, together with Prime Minister volatile pro-Europeanism, the Czech Republic comes 
off as an unpredictable international player. Overall, the new discourse introduced by the 
current President and Prime Minister, is not so new after all, constructed on the national 
myths of the “Munique Syndrom” and the “Hussite stigma” feeding Czech geopolitical 
insecurity and exceptionalism respectively, employed by the former President Václav Klaus. 
Furthermore, their populist ideology relies on economic pragmatism rather than the higher 
moral ideals promoted by Masaryk and Havel or the Polish and Hungarian grand 
conservative-nationalist narrative, recalling the Normalization period discourse. Finally, 
neither of the two current leaders presents a coherent, long-term vision for the Czech 
Republic, but they rather build their appeal around the construction of social antagonism, 
short-term goals, and a minimalist conception of democracy. They emphasize the importance 
of elections and promote aspects of direct democracy, but also attempt to dismantle checks 
and balances, and centralize power in their hands. These growing illiberal tendencies have 
been registered in the democracy rankings of EIU and Freedom House, particularly in the low 
scores when it comes to the functioning of the government and political participation, and but 
also in the decrease in civil liberties, the independence of media and the rule of law. Owing to 
the lack of a truly democratic leadership, political instability and corruption, political society 
seems to be suffering the most, nevertheless the trend underlines the interconnectedness of all 
the democracy arenas.     
Considering the above cited findings, we may conclude that the empirical investigation 
overall confirmed our research hypotheses. As for our first research question, which aimed 
to identify the origins and character of the retreat of democracy in the Czech Republic, 
the sub-systemic-level discourse analysis validated that the current Prime Minister Babiš 
and President Zeman, managed to rise to power, and gradually implement “executive 




aggrandizement”, effectively thanks to the mobilization of exclusive identity 
as a consequence of a series of internal and external crises, which originated the dislocation 
of the official post-transition discourse. Bearing in mind the thorough inspection 
of the political leaders’ rhetoric and agenda, we may characterize the illiberal challenge 
as populist, but we cannot categorize both Babiš and Zeman unequivocally as TAN forces, 
as in the case of their Hungarian and Polish counterparts. Contrasting the EIU’s and Freedom 
House’s international democracy rankings in the systemic-level part of our empirical 
investigation, we answered the second  research question focused on indicating which arenas 
of democracy have been the most affected and why by the crisis. Based on the compared 
scores, we verified that, in fact, the arena of political society has been affected the most so far, 
with no democracy arena persisting intact, due to the accumulation of economic, political 
and media power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the President’s attempts at stretching 
his constitutional powers. However, as their suggested system alterations have remained 
mostly discursive, also thanks to the critical opposition in form of the Senate, civil society 
and media, there is hope that “truth will prevail” over this illiberal challenge. Nonetheless, 
democracy in the Czech Republic is clearly in need of a revitalization, when it comes 
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7. APPENDIX  
7.1 Discourse Analysis of the President Miloš Zeman 
In order to characterize the President’s agenda and rhetorical strategies, with a special 
focus on the construction of social antagonism, and thus uncover the changes in the official 
Czech discourse and its impact on democracy, the following four discourses were analyzed: 
D1: Christmas Message of the President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman (26/12/2018), 
original Czech title: Vánoční poselství prezidenta republiky Miloše Zemana  
D2: Christmas Message of the President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman (26/12/2019), 
original Czech title: Vánoční poselství prezidenta republiky Miloše Zemana  
D3: The Address of the President of the Czech Republic to the Nation (18/03/2020), original 
Czech title: Projev prezidenta republiky k národu  
D4: The Address of the President of the Czech Republic to the Nation (16/10/2020), original 
Czech title: Projev prezidenta republiky k národu   
President Zeman: Agenda 
Message Quotation (CZ) Translation (EN) Interpretation 
I represent normal 
citizens with 
respectable jobs, 
who have their own 
head and do not let 
themselves be 
manipulated. 
D1: „(…) i nadále se budu, a 
to velmi rád, setkávat s 
normálními občany tváří v 
tvář během mých výjezdů po 
jednotlivých krajích. (…) aby 
v příštím roce za vámi zůstala 
úctyhodná práce, které si druzí 
lidé budou vážit.“ 
D1: “(…) I promise that I will 
continue meeting normal 
citizens face-to-face, and that 
with utmost pleasure, during 
my tours into the regions. (…) 
your leaving behind 
respectable work which others 
will appreciate.” 
The centrality of the 
empty signifiers “the 
good people” against 
“the corrupt elite” in 
Zeman’s populist 
program. However, his 
concept of “the 
people” is quite 
exclusive as it includes 
only his sympathizers, 
while labeling others 
negatively. This is true 
even in crisis, as the 
D3 and D4 
demonstrate. 
D2: „Chtěl bych vám všem 
popřát, abyste i nadále byli 
svobodnými osobnostmi, které 
si vytvářejí svůj vlastní názor 
a nenechají se nikým 
manipulovat. Abyste si vážili 
sami sebe právě proto, že máte 
vlastní informovaný názor.“ 
D2: “I would like to wish 
everyone, to keep on being 
free people, which form their 
own opinion and do not let 
themselves be manipulated by 
anyone. To have respect for 
yourselves precisely because 
you have your own informed 
opinion.” 
D3: „Nesmírně vítám 
spontánní aktivity 
dobrovolníků, kteří se 
sdružují, aby pomohli svým 
spoluobčanům (…) Dokonce i 
herci, z nichž někteří si 
stěžovali, že nemají kšefty, by 
udělali lépe, kdyby například 
navštívili domovy důchodců a 
přinesli tam trochu radosti.“ 
D3: “I welcome immensely 
spontaneous activities of 
voluntaries who get together 
to help their fellow citizens 
(…) Even actors, some of 
whom complained they didn’t 
have gigs, would do better if 
they would for example visit a 
retirement home and bring 
some happiness there.”   




D4: „Jsme v situaci, kdy o 
lidské životy bojují naši 
zdravotníci a já bych jim chtěl 
vyjádřit úctu, obdiv a 
poděkování. Ale o lidské 
životy může bojovat každý z 
nás.“ 
D4: “We are in a situation, 
when our medics are fighting 
for human lives and I would 
like to express my respect, 
admiration and thanks to 
them. But everyone of us may 
fight for human lives. ” 
I support the 
Government and its 
vision. 
D1: „Chtěl bych poděkovat 
předsedům tří politických 
stran, kteří našli odvahu k 
vytvoření a podpoře takové 
vlády, Andreji Babišovi, Janu 
Hamáčkovi a Vojtěch Filipovi. 
Vládě přeji úspěch v její práci 
(…).“ 
D1: “I would like to thank the 
leaders of the three political 
parties - Andrej Babiš, Jan 
Hamáček and Vojtěch Filip, 
who found the courage to 
create and support such a 
government. I wish our new 
government success in its 
work (…).” 
This reiterated 
message reflects the 
President’s 
collaboration with PM 
Babiš since his double 
appointment (and 
Babiš’s endorsement 
of Zeman’s reelection). 
However, Zeman’s 
support of Babiš 
decreases during the 
coronavirus crisis. 
D2: „Teď bych pochválil 
vládu za to, že předložila 
národní investiční plán s 
horizontem 30 let, protože 
některé velké projekty 
samozřejmě přesahují funkční 
období jakékoliv vlády.“ 
D2: “Now I would like to 
compliment the Government 
to presenting a national 
investment plan with the 
horizon of 30 years, since 
some large projects exceed the 
term in office of any 
government.” 
D3: „V tomto prohlášení jsem 
plně podpořil vládu České 
republiky v jejich opatřeních.“ 
D3: “In that statement I fully 
supported the Government of 
the Czech Republic in their 
measures.” 
D4: „Plně podporuji opatření 
vlády, i když si myslím, že 
někdy mohla být lépe 
komunikována.“ 
D4: “I fully support the 
measures of the Government, 
although I think they could be 
communicated better 
sometimes.” 
Elections are the 
most important part 
of democracy. 
D1: „Demokracie, to nejsou 
jenom práva. Demokracie, to 
jsou i povinnosti. Já 
dlouhodobě doporučuji, opět 
po vzoru první republiky, 
abychom se vrátili k myšlence 
povinné volební účasti, která 
není časově náročná, ale která 
by výrazně rozšířila počet 
voličů, a tím přinutila 
politické strany k vyšší 
aktivitě.“ 
D1: “Democracy does not 
mean just rights. Democracy 
also means duties. I have long 
recommended that we return 
to the practice of the First 
Republic and to the idea of a 
mandatory voter turnout, 
which is not time consuming, 
but it would significantly 
increase the number of voters 
and force political parties to 
increase their activity 
thereby.” 
Unlike the media or 









(minimalist concept of 
democracy)  
D2: „V parlamentní 
demokracii, kterou jsme a 
budeme, premiéři přicházejí a 
odcházejí na základě výsledku 
svobodných voleb.“ 
D2: “In a parliamentary 
democracy, which we are and 
we will be, the prime 
ministers come and go based 
on the results of free 
elections.” 
City and county 
representatives 
should be elected 
directly to avoid 
the formation of 
coalitions against 
D1: „Mnohdy se stává, že 
vítěz voleb je obejit a že 
vzniká koalice proti tomuto 
vítězi. Nepokládám to za 
správné, považuji to za 
obcházení vůle voličů. Co 
D1: “It often happens that the 
winner is eliminated, and a 
coalition is formed against 
such a winner. In my opinion, 
this is not right, and I consider 
it a circumvention of the 
Zeman promotes 
direct democracy as a 
way of fighting the 
corrupt elite. He 
repeatedly warns 
against clientelist 




the winner of 
elections. 
proti tomu dělat, abychom jen 
nelamentovali. Dlouhodobě 
navrhuji přímou volbu jak 
starostů, tak primátorů, tak 
hejtmanů, a to tak, že jimi jsou 
zvoleni ti, kdo na kandidátce 
nejúspěšnějšího kandidujícího 
subjektu dostali největší počet 
preferenčních hlasů.“ 
voters' will. What shall stop us 
whining about it? I have long 
been suggesting the 
introduction of the direct vote 
of both mayors and regional 
council presidents, so that the 
candidate with the largest 
number of preferential votes 
on the winning candidate list 
would be automatically 
elected to this position.” 
structures on all 
political levels, 
including regional and 
communal. 
 
It is not democratic 
and hysterical to 
demonstrate 




D1: „(…) demonstrovat za 
svržení, tedy demisi vlády v 
podmínkách svobodných 
voleb podle mého názoru 
pohrdáním vůlí voličů. Já 
bych jen chtěl připomenout 
dva Masarykovy citáty. První, 
tož demokracii již máme, teď 
ještě nějaké ty demokraty. 
Demokrat je ten, kdo 
respektuje výsledky 
svobodných voleb, i když se 
mu třeba nelíbí. Druhý citát 
zní, rozčilení není program.“ 
 
D1: “(…) I see the 
demonstration to overthrow a 
government created after free 
elections contemptuous of 
voters´ will. I would just like 
to recall two Masaryk’s 
quotes. First, we already have 
democracy; now we need 
some democrats. A democrat 
respects the outcome of free 
elections, even if they do not 
like it. The second quote goes, 
being upset is not a political 
program.” 
Zeman believes that 
civil activity, such as 
demonstrations, is 
undemocratic. After 
expressing their active 
citizenship in the 
election, people should 
step aside and let the 
rules rule.  
D2: „Povšiml jsem si rovněž 
demonstrací v Praze, jejichž 
účastníci vyžadovali demisi 
ministerského předsedy. Na to 
se dá odpovědět velice 
stručně. V parlamentní 
demokracii, kterou jsme a 
budeme, premiéři přicházejí a 
odcházejí na základě výsledku 
svobodných voleb.“ 
D2: “I also noticed the 
demonstrations in Prague, 
whose participants demand the 
demission of the Prime 
Minister. That can be 
answered quite briefly. In a 
parliamentary democracy, 
which we are and we will be, 
prime ministers come and go 
based on the results of free 
elections.” 
Citizens should 
ignore “The Better 
People” because 
they do not 
understand 
anything.   
D1: „(…) televize, dále tištěná 
média, dále neziskové 
organizace a konečně církev 
asi s 25 procenty 
důvěryhodnosti. (…) 
Lepšolidé jsou ti, kteří se 
považují za něco lepšího než 
my ostatní a kteří nám 
neustále radí, co máme dělat, a 
kteří své názory považují za 
nadřazené názorům těch 
druhých. Když se ovšem na 
strukturu lepšolidí podíváme, 
tak vidíme, že například 
sdělovací prostředky jsou 
mnohdy složeny z 
komentátorů, kteří každý den 
píší o něčem jiném, a přitom 
pořádně ničemu nerozumí. A 
tito lidé nám chtějí radit. (…) 
ignorujte radílky, kteří sami v 
životě nedokázali nic. 
D1: “(…) television, printed 
media, non-profit 
organizations, and finally the 
Church came last with about 
25 per cent of credibility. (…) 
The Better-People are those 
who consider themselves 
better than the rest of us, who 
keep mentoring us on what to 
do and who regard their views 
superior to those of others. 
However, when we look at the 
structure of the “Better-
People” community, we can 
see that, for example, media 
often consist of commentators 
who write about something 
else every day whilst 
understanding nothing. And 
these people want to advise 
us. (…) ignore the smart 
alecks who have yet to prove 
Although the media 
represent the third 
“island of deviation”, 
which Zeman 
promised to fight 
against (in both of his 
Inaugural Speeches, 
2013 and 2018), he 
criticizes it the most 
throughout his time in 
office, for lying to the 
people. Ha warns 
against the media 
owned by Zdeněk 
Bakala and the public 
television station, 
Česká televize. 





D2: „Chtěl bych vám všem 
popřát, abyste i nadále byli 
svobodnými osobnostmi, které 
si vytvářejí svůj vlastní názor 
a nenechají se nikým 
manipulovat.“ 
D2: “I would like to wish 
everyone, to keep on being 
free people, which form their 
own opinion and do not let 
themselves be manipulated by 
anyone.” 
D3: „Nevšímejte si příliš 
poštěkávání a vřeštění našich 
novinářských komentátorů, 
kteří jako obvykle píší o všem 
a nerozumí ničemu. “ 
D3: “Do not mind too much 
the barking and screeching of 
our news commentators, who, 
as usual, write about 
everything and understand 
nothing.” 
We should rejoice 
from current 
economic growth 
but beware of 
potential problems. 
D1: „Všichni jsme se radovali 
a dosud radujeme nad 
ekonomickým růstem. Dnes 
poprvé bych chtěl naopak 
poněkud varovat, varovat před 
zpomalením ekonomického 
růstu, které má několik příčin. 
Zaprvé je to vznikající 
obchodní nebo celní válka 
mezi dvěma největšími 
světovými ekonomikami, tj. 
americkou a čínskou. Zadruhé 
je to brexit, ale zatřetí je to 
také to, že náš ekonomický 
růst brzdí nedostatek 
pracovních sil.“ 
D1: “We were and we still are 
enjoying a steady economic 
growth. Today, for the first 
time, I would like to warn you 
against a deceleration of the 
economic growth which might 
be coming for several reasons. 
First, it is the emerging trade 
and customs war between the 
two world’s largest 
economies, the USA and 
China. The second reason is 
the Brexit. Third, the shortage 
of skilled labor force is 
hindering our economic 
growth.” 
Like the PM, also the 
President invites the 
population to enjoy 





his terms, Zeman has 
promoted economic 
diplomacy particularly 
through business deals 
with Russia and China. 
Also, he has criticized 
the effort to 
completely replace 
traditional energy with 
renewable sources. 
D2: „vítejte v úspěšné zemi, 
zemi, která má nejnižší míru 
nezaměstnanosti v Evropské 
unii, která má stabilní 
ekonomický růst, která má 
relativně klesající a poměrně 
nízký státní dluh, zemi, kde 
roste jak průměrná mzda, tak 
starobní důchody. Toto vše 
jsou úspěchy. A i když o nás 
češích se říká, že jsme 
nejskeptičtější národ v Evropě, 
myslím si, že nad těmito 
úspěchy bychom se měli 
společně radovat. To 
samozřejmě neznamená, že by 
neexistovaly problémy (…)“ 
D2: “welcome to a successful 
country, country, which has 
the lowest unemployment rate 
in the European Union, which 
has a stable economic growth, 
which a relatively decreasing 
and quite low state debt, 
country where the average 
wage as well as retirement 
income are growing. All these 
are achievements. And 
although the Czechs are called 
the most skeptical nation in 
Europe, I think that we should 
rejoice together at these 
successes. That does not mean 
that there would not be any 
problems (…)” 
We should not be 
afraid of 
digitalization but 
embrace it as it 
could help speed 
up the state and 
thus simplify our 
D1: „Dlouhodobé řešení vidím 
ke zvýšení produktivity práce, 
a to konkrétně formou 
robotizace. (…) Považuji za 
nesmyslné, abychom této 
tendenci bránili.“ 
D1: “I see the long-term 
solution in the increase of 
work productivity, in 
particular via robotic 
automation. (…) I find it 
pointless to resist this 
tendency.” 
Digitalization and 
Investment appear to 
be the two topics 
promoted by both the 
PM and the President.  




lives.  D2: „Pomalost. Pomalost 
soudních řízení, pomalost 
stavebních řízení, pomalost 
výstavby dopravní 
infrastruktury.“ 
D2: “Slowness. Slowness of 
legal proceedings, slowness of 
construction proceedings, 
slowness of transport 
infrastructure development.” 
Investments are the 




D1: „Závěrem ekonomické 
části bych chtěl vysoce ocenit 
vládní návrh Národního 
investičního plánu 
rozpočítaného na 12 let (…) 
jedině investice, i když nemají 
volební právo, nás přenášejí 
do budoucnosti.“ 
D1: “To conclude the 
economic part, I would like to 
highly appreciate the 
government's 12-year National 
Investment Plan proposal (…) 
only investments carry us to 
the future, even if they have 
no suffrage.” 
D2: „Teď bych pochválil 
vládu za to, že předložila 
národní investiční plán s 
horizontem 30 let, protože 
některé velké projekty 
samozřejmě přesahují funkční 
období jakékoliv vlády.“ 
D2: “Now I would like to 
compliment the Government 
to presenting a national 
investment plan with the 
horizon of 30 years, since 
some large projects exceed the 
term in office of any 
government.” 
NATO should 
continue to fight 
Islamic terrorism 
and EU should 
protect its borders. 
Thanks to the V4, 
the migrant quotas 
were rejected.  
D1: „Pokud jsme o 
Severoatlantickou alianci, víte, 
že dlouhodobě plně podporuji 
naše zahraniční mise v rámci 
boje proti mezinárodnímu 
islámskému terorismu, 
zejména pak v Afghánistánu. 
(…) Co se týče Evropské unie, 
velice si vážím činnosti 
Visegrádské skupiny. Té se 
podařilo téměř nemožné, 
dosáhnout toho, že už se v 
zásadě přestalo diskutovat o 
nesmyslné myšlence 
migračních kvót.  
D1: “You know that within 
the NATO I have long and 
fully supported our 
participation in foreign 
missions against the 
international Islamic 
terrorism, especially in 
Afghanistan. (…) As far as the 
European Union is concerned, 
I highly appreciate the 
activities of the Visegrad 
Group. It managed to achieve 
the almost impossible. It 
successfully stopped the 
discussion about the 
nonsensical idea of migrant 
quotas.  
According to Zeman, 
migration is connected 
to Islamism, and hence 
extremism, his first 
“island of deviation”, 
which represents a 
security and an 
ideological threat. That 
is why NATO should 
be more active in the 
fight against Islamic 
terrorism and the EU 
in the protection of its 
borders. V4 stood up 
to the “incapable EU 
transnational elite”, 
defending national 
interests and security.  
We should not 
accuse the Chinese 
of spying, but learn 




We should be 
grateful to China 




D1: „Číňani tady opravdu 
provádějí technologickou 
špionáž, oni se sem jezdí 
seznamovat s tím, proč naše 
vlaky jezdí tak pomalu, když 
jejich vlaky jezdí 300 km/h.“ 
D1: “the Chinese do carry out 
industrial espionage here. 
They come to the Czech 
Republic to investigate why 
our trains are so slow while 
theirs run at 300 km an hour.” 
The President has, at 
various occasions, 
promoted Chinese 
interests above the 
Czech national 
interest, criticizing the 
Security Service’s 
reports warning of the 
Chinese threats (the 
Huawei case). Also, he 
has repeatedly thanked 
China for sending 
(purchased) supplies 
amid the first 
coronavirus wave.   
 
D3: „Chtěl bych proto 
poděkovat Čínské lidové 
republice, která nám jako 
jediná země pomohla v 
dodávce těchto prostředků.“ 
D3: “I would like to thank the 
People's Republic of China, 
which has as the only country 
helped in the supply of these 
resources.” 





D1: „budu usilovat o obranu 
národních zájmů České 
republiky a její suverenity jak 
v oblasti migrace, tak v 
oblastech dalších. Slibuji, že i 
D1: “I promise to strive to 
defend the national interests of 
the Czech Republic and its 
sovereignty in the area of 
migration as well as other 




diplomacy with China 




diplomacy. nadále budu podporovat 
ekonomickou diplomacii, a to 
jak náš vývoz do zahraničí, tak 
příliv efektivních zahraničních 
investic k nám.“ 
areas. I promise that I will 
continue to support economic 
diplomacy, both our export 
abroad and the inflow of 
effective foreign investments 
to our country.” 
and Russia does not at 
times collide with his 
promise to defend 
national interests and 
security (the country’s 
pledge to promote 




The human impact 
on climate change 
is overrated, 
discussions of 
climate change are 
exaggerated and 
dangerous for the 
economy of the 
Czech Republic 
and the EU. 
D2: „Domnívám se, že z 
diskuzí o klimatických 
změnách se stává nové 
náboženství, a dovolte mi 
proto, abych byl kacířem. (…) 
Nejsem si jist, zda 
rozhodujícím faktorem 
globálního oteplení je právě 
lidská činnost, a nikoli 
přírodní zákony, pohyb 
zemské osy a další kosmické 
vlivy.“ 
D2: “I believe that the 
discussions about climate 
change are becoming a new 
religion, and allow me then to 
be a heretic. (…) I am not sure 
whether human activity is a 
decisive the factor of global 
warming, or rather natural 
laws, the movement of the 
Earth’s axis and other cosmic 
effects.”  
Similarly, as his 
predecessor Klaus, 




European Green Deal 
as ideological and 
hurtful to economics, 
considering that the 
Czech Republic is still 





it is important not 
to panic, follow the 
Government’s 
measures and listen 
to experts, not fake 
news. 
D3: „abyste se vyhnuli dvěma 
extrémům. Ten první spočívá 
v tom, že tuto epidemii budete 
zlehčovat. Například jakýsi 
divadelní principál zcela 
nedávno prohlásil, že 
koronavirus je jenom lehká 
chřipka, a kritizoval opatření 
vlády. Ten druhý extrém pak 
spočívá v tom, že propadnete 
panice a strachu. (…) A o to 
větší pozornost věnujte radám 
odborníků, které vám mohou 
pomoci.“ 
D3: “try to avoid two 
extremes. The first consists in 
playing down the epidemy. 
For example, some theatre 
manager quite recently 
proclaimed, that coronavirus 
is just a light flu and criticized 
Government’s measures. The 
other extreme then consists in 
sinking into panic and fear. 
(…) Pay even greater attention 
to the advice of specialists, 







but not a full 
lockdown) and 
spreading fake news, 
the president did not 
strife to unite the 
nation during the 
crisis, but triggered 
more social 
antagonism, 
criticizing media and 
the political opposition 
as usual, but also 
regular citizens 
suffering from the 
crisis.  
D4: „Máme k dispozici jenom 
jednu jedinou zbraň, protože 
vakcína ještě neexistuje. Touto 
zbraní je malý kousek látky, 
který si přivěsíme na obličej a 
který nás chrání před nákazou 
a naopak my chráníme druhé 
před touto nákazou. (…) 
Ignorujte názory těchto lidí, 
protože nejsou odborné, a 
věřte odborníkům, protože 
jedině ti nám mohou pomoci.“ 
D4: “We have only one 
weapon at our disposal since 
the vaccine does not yet exist. 
A small piece of fabric is that 
weapon which we hang on our 
face and which protects us 
against the contagion and vice 
versa we protect others against 
this contagion. (…) Ignore the 
opinions of these people 
because they are not expert, 
and trust the specialists, 




other countries are 
doing worse than 
us and we should 
be grateful to 
D3: „Chtěl bych proto 
poděkovat Čínské lidové 
republice, která nám jako 
jediná země pomohla v 
dodávce těchto prostředků.“ 
D3: “I would like to thank the 
People's Republic of China, 
which has as the only country 
helped in the supply of these 
resources.” 
Similarly as the PM, 
the President did not 
take much advantage 
of the pandemic to 
showcase international 
solidarity, repeatedly 




China for their 
help. 
D4: „Podívejte se třeba na 
Švédsko, tam už je teď přes 
šest tisíc mrtvých, a to 
nemluvím o Izraeli.  
D4: “Look at Sweden for 
example, there are now 
already over six thousand dead 
and I am not even talking of 
Israel.” 
appreciating only 
China’s help with the 
medic supplies (CR 
purchased), otherwise 
portraying the Czech 
Republic as a country 
that is not doing as bad 
as the others.  
Figure 12. Discourse analysis of the President’s agenda (own table) 
 
President Zeman: Rhetorical Strategies 
Figures of speech Quotation (CZ) Translation (EN) Interpretation 




D1: primitivní hlupáci; 
ignorujte radílky, kteří sami v 
životě nedokázali nic; milí 
přátelé  
D1: primitive fools; ignore the 
smart alecks who have not 
achieved anything in life; dear 
friends  
The President mixes 
informal (sometimes 
vulgar) and formal 
(even literary, Latin) 
lexicons to create an 
impression of a 
“dialogue between 
equals”, but his 
relation to the 
audience sounds 
often rather superior, 
as that of a teacher 
explaining something 
to students and 
occasionally 
rebuking them. 
D2: Víte, co to jsou v tomto 
smyslu parašutisti? To jsou 
lidé, kteří jsou na kandidátku 
shozeni shora; zlostně 
nadávají 
D2: Do you know who the 
parachutists are in this sense? 
They are people, who are 
thrown on the candidate list 
from the top; they grumble 
angrily 
D3: poštěkávání a vřeštění 
našich novinářských 
komentátorů; herci, z nichž 
někteří si stěžovali, že nemají 
kšefty 
D3: barking and screeching of 
our news commentators; actors, 
some of whom complained they 
didn’t have gigs  
D4: Ignorujte názory těchto 
lidí, protože nejsou odborné 
D4: Ignore the opinions of these 






D1: Nesmírně si toho vážím a 
slibuji, že i nadále budu 
usilovat o obranu národních 
zájmů České republiky a její 
suverenity jak v oblasti 
migrace, tak v oblastech 
dalších. Slibuji, že i nadále 
budu podporovat 
ekonomickou diplomacii, a to 
jak náš vývoz do zahraničí, tak 
příliv efektivních zahraničních 
investic k nám. A konečně 
slibuji, že i nadále se budu, a 
to velmi rád, setkávat s 
normálními občany tváří v 
tvář během mých výjezdů po 
jednotlivých krajích.   
D1: I deeply appreciate it and I 
promise to strive to defend the 
national interests of the Czech 
Republic and its sovereignty in 
the area of migration as well as 
other areas. I promise that I will 
continue to support economic 
diplomacy, both our export 
abroad and the inflow of 
effective foreign investments to 
our country. Finally, I promise 
that I will continue meeting 
normal citizens face-to-face, 
and that with utmost pleasure, 
during my tours into the 
regions. 
Zeman employs 
repetition tools often 
to build up the 
emotional intensity 
of the message. In 
the case of the 
redundant expression 
“normal citizens”, 
the populist content 
is clear. 
 
D2: Pomalost. Pomalost 
soudních řízení, pomalost 
stavebních řízení, pomalost 
výstavby dopravní 
infrastruktury.(…) Chtěl bych 
vám popřát bolest. Ale víte, 
jakou bolest? Takovou bolest, 
o které mluvil Tomáš 
Masaryk, když řekl, myšlení 
D2: Slowness. Slowness of legal 
proceedings, slowness of 
construction proceedings, 
slowness of transport 
infrastructure development. (…) 
I would like to wish you pain. 
But you know what kind of 
pain? That type to pain Tomáš 
Masaryk spoke of, when he 




bolí. said, thinking is painful. 
D3: Přál bych vám, abychom 
se měli rádi, abychom k sobě 
byli laskaví a vstřícní, 
abychom pomáhali jeden 
druhému a abychom dokázali 
v této těžké době svoji 
lidskost. 
D3: I wish that we would love 
each other, that we would be 
kind-hearted and forthcoming to 
one another, that we would help 
each other and that we would 
manage to show our humanity 
in this difficult time.   
D4: Roste počet nakažených 
koronavirem, roste počet 
hospitalizovaných, roste počet 
těžce nemocných a co horšího, 
roste počet mrtvých. 
D4: The number of infected by 
the coronavirus is growing, the 
number of hospitalized is 
growing, the number of the 
seriously ill is growing and what 












other”, and thus to 
further divide the 
society.  
D2: Klimatičtí proroci D2: The Climate Prophets  
 
D4: Antirouškaři D4: The Anti-Mask People 
Intertextuality, 
references 
D1: Já bych jen chtěl 
připomenout dva Masarykovy 
citáty. První, tož demokracii 
již máme, teď ještě nějaké ty 
demokraty. (…) Druhý citát 
zní, rozčilení není program. 
D1: I would just like to recall 
two Masaryk’s quotes. First, we 
already have democracy; now 
we need some democrats. (…) 
The second quote goes, being 
upset is not a program. 
The President takes 
advantage of 
intertextuality to 
show off his 
intelligence, humour, 
and adopt the 
identities of others, 
like the first 
President of 
Czechoslovakia 




D2: Takovou bolest, o které 
mluvil Tomáš Masaryk, když 
řekl, myšlení bolí. 
D2: That type of pain, which 
Tomáš Masaryk spoke of when 
he said, thinking is painful. 
D4: Dovolte mi, abych vám 
připomněl krásnou větu z 
Talmudu, ten, kdo zachránil 
jeden lidský život, zachránil 
celé lidstvo. 
D4: Allow me to remind you of 
a beautiful phrase from Talmud, 
the one who saved one human 





D1: jak říkají mafiáni, 
předložit nabídku, která se 
neodmítá; skočila blbá nálada 
D1: as the Mafia puts it, a 
proposition which cannot be 




Zeman uses various 
rhetorical tropes to 
make his speeches 
more compelling, 
literary sounding and 
even popular 
(employing proverbs 
to demonstrate his 
knowledge of the 
Czech language and 
approximate the 
audience). 
Sometimes he used 




D2: Víte, co to jsou v tomto 
smyslu parašutisti? To jsou 
lidé, kteří jsou na kandidátku 
shozeni shora; prosím, 
abychom nezůstávali v 
bublinách svých názorů; 
myšlení bolí 
D2: Do you know who the 
parachutists are in this sense? 
They are people, who are 
thrown on the candidate list 
from the top; please, let’s not 
remain inside the bubble of our 
ideas; thinking is painful  
D3: když teče do lodi voda, 
musí všichni k pumpám  
D3: when the boat is leaking, all 
hands to the pumps 
D4: Máme k dispozici jenom 
jednu jedinou zbraň, protože 
vakcína ještě neexistuje. Touto 
zbraní je malý kousek látky. 
(…) Povolali jsme do zbraně 
vítěze nad první vlnou 
koronaviru. (…) až usedne 
prach na bojišti, budeme sčítat 
D4: We have only one weapon 
at our disposal since the vaccine 
does not yet exist. A small piece 
of fabric is that weapon. (…) 
We called up to arms the victor 
over the first wave of 
coronavirus. (…) When the dust 
settles, we will count our gains 









D1: předsedům tří politických 
stran, kteří našli odvahu k 
vytvoření a podpoře takové 
vlády, Andreji Babišovi, Janu 
Hamáčkovi a Vojtěch Filipovi 
vs ti, kdo nás neustále varují 
před špiony, z nás tak trochu 
dělají nesvéprávné a 
manipulovatelné bytosti, které 
se nedokáží samy ubránit 
D1: the leaders of the three 
political parties - Andrej Babiš, 
Jan Hamáček and Vojtěch Filip, 
who found the courage to create 
and support such a government 
vs those who constantly warn us 
of spies, try to make us 
incapable beings, easy to 
manipulate and lacking the 
capacity to protect ourselves 
The President makes 
use of these figures 
of speech in the 
subtle construction 
of social antagonism, 
as the individuals 
responding to the 




referred to by names 
and titles, while the 
bad elite and the 
others (Opposition, 
Media, Civil Society, 
GAL and more) are 
collectivized, often 
anonymized.  
D2: paní ministryně místního 
rozvoje Klára Dostálová 
předloží návrh nového 
stavebního zákona, který 
stavební řízení urychlí, a je-li 
kritizována, tak je někdy 
kritizována právě těmi, kdo 
přispěli k jeho pomalosti 
D2: Ms. Minister of Regional 
Development Klára Dostálová 
presents a proposal of a new 
construction law, which will 
speed up the construction 
proceedings, and if she is 
criticized, then she is sometimes 
criticized by those who 
contributed to its slowness 
D3: podpořil vládu České 
republiky vs jakýsi divadelní 
principál 
D3: supported the Government 
of the Czech Republic vs some 
theatre manager 
D4: Nenechte se svést lidmi, 
kteří sice o epidemii vůbec nic 
nevědí, ale kvůli mediální 
pozornosti jsou ochotni říkat 
věci, které poškozují naši 
společnost vs vítěze nad první 
vlnou koronaviru, pana 
profesora Prymulu 
D4: Do not let yourselves be 
misled by people who know 
nothing of the epidemy, but are 
willing to say things that harm 
our society for the media’s 
attention vs the victor over the 
first wave of coronavirus, Mr. 
Professor Prymula 
Modality 
- I would like 
to, believe, 
allow me to, I 
think we 
should, I am 
not sure if 
- Let’s 
 
D1: Chtěl bych ze srdce 
poděkovat všem občanům, 
kteří mi dali svůj hlas. (…) 
Chtěl bych poděkovat 
předsedům tří politických 
stran (…) Nyní mi dovolte, 
abych přešel k ekonomické 
situaci.  
D1: I would like to thank 
cordially to all the citizens who 
gave me their vote. (…) I would 
like to thank the leaders of the 
three political parties (…) Now 
allow me to move on to the 





most often, to assert 
his authority in a 
sincere and educated 
way. His last 
discourse is more 
assertive, but still 
polite sounding, as 
he uses first person 
plural imperative 
considering himself 
part of the audience. 
D2: Myslím si, že nad těmito 
úspěchy bychom se měli 
společně radovat 
(…)Domnívám se, že z 
diskuzí o klimatických 
změnách se stává nové 
náboženství, a dovolte mi 
proto, abych byl kacířem 
Nejsem si jist, zda 
rozhodujícím faktorem 
globálního oteplení je právě 
lidská činnost 
D2: I think that we should 
rejoice together at these 
successes (…) I believe that the 
discussions about climate 
change are becoming a new 
religion and allow me then to be 
a heretic. (…) I am not sure 
whether human activity is a 
decisive the factor of global 
warming, or rather natural laws, 
the movement of the Earth’s 
axis and other cosmic effects. 
D3: Chtěl bych vás proto 
vyzvat, abyste se vyhnuli 
dvěma extrémům. (…) Chtěl 
bych rovněž naši opozici 
vyzvat k tomu, aby 
podporovala opatření vlády. 
D3: I would like to invite you to 
avoid two extremes. (…) I 
would also like to invite our 
opposition to support the 
Government’s measures. 
D4: Ale nemluvme teď jenom 
o vládních opatřeních. 
D4: But let us not only talk of 
the Government’s measures 




Mluvme o tom, co můžeme 
udělat my sami. (…) Dělejme 
vše pro to, abychom touto 
zkouškou vyšli se ctí. 
now. Let us talk of what we 
alone can do. (…) Let us do 
everything we can to pass this 
test with honor.  
Hedging D1: Zaprvé, v době první 
republiky se nakonec ustálila 
prezidentská tradice vánočních 
poselství, a tuto tradici 
zastavil až Klement Gottwald, 
který pronesl 1. ledna 1949 
právě novoroční projev. 
D1: First, in the era of the First 
Republic, the presidents 
traditionally gave a Christmas 
Message and this tradition had 
not been broken until the 1st 
January 1949 when Klement 
Gottwald delivered his first 
New Year Speech. 
The President uses 
hedging to structure 
his discourse to 
appear detailed and 





information). He also 
employs the 
technique to avoid 
directness and to 
tone down the 
intensity of the 
message (ex. during 
the pandemic). 
 
D2: Řekl jsem jim, vítejte v 
úspěšné zemi, zemi, která má 
nejnižší míru nezaměstnanosti 
v Evropské unii, která má 
stabilní ekonomický růst, která 
má relativně klesající a 
poměrně nízký státní dluh, 
zemi, kde roste jak průměrná 
mzda, tak starobní důchody. 
D2: I told them, welcome to a 
successful country, country, 
which has the lowest 
unemployment rate in the 
European Union, which has a 
stable economic growth, which 
a relatively decreasing and quite 
low state debt, country where 
the average wage as well as 
retirement income are growing. 
D3: Pokud jsem správně 
informován, první dodávka 
testovacích přípravků již 
dorazila do České republiky a 
k dispozici je i letadlo Ruslan, 
velkokapacitní letadlo, které 
tuto pomoc bude zajišťovat v 
budoucnosti. 
D3: If I am correctly informed, 
the first supply of the testing 
resources has already arrived to 
the Czech Republic and also the 
airplane Ruslan is at disposal, a 
high capacity aircraft, , which 
will secure this help in the 
future. 
D4: Kdysi, když počet 
mrtvých byl na velmi nízké 
úrovni, jsme se mohli utěšovat 
tím, že covid se dá vyléčit, ale 
úmrtí se samozřejmě vyléčit 
nedá a je to nesmírná ztráta 
pro naši společnost, pro rodiny 
těch, kdo zemřeli, pro všechny 
z nás. 
D4: Once, when the number of 
the dead was at a very low level, 
we could have comforted 
ourselves that covid can be 
cured, but death of course 
cannot be cured and it is a great 
loss for our society, for the 
families of those who died, for 
all of us.  
Figure 13. Discourse analysis of the President’s rhetorical strategies (own table) 
 
President Zeman: Social Antagonism 
- structural oppositions - “ideological squaring” 
- “us” and “them” division 
- individualisation (honorifics) vs collectivisation (anonymisation), e.g. Rhethorical Strategies table 
- cultural war against Havel’s “Truth and Love” philosophy  
- Zeman’s critics, clueless, unsuccessful, jealous 
The Other Quotation (CZ) Translation (EN) 
Civil Society D1: ti, kdo hází květiny do odpadkových 
košů, jsou podle mého mínění primitivní 
hlupáci 
D2: povšiml jsem si demonstrací 
středoškoláků proti klimatické změně, nic 
proti tomu, byl bych pouze rád, aby 
demonstrovali v sobotu a v pátek se učili 
D1: those who throw flowers into litter bins 
are, in my opinion, primitive fools 
D2: I noticed a demonstration of high 
school students againt climate change, 
nothing against it, I would only be glad if 
they would demonstrate on Saturday and 
study on Friday 
Media, NGOs, D1: Lepšolidé jsou ti, kteří se považují za D1: The Better-People are those who 




Intelligence  něco lepšího než my ostatní a kteří nám 
neustále radí, co máme dělat, a kteří své 
názory považují za nadřazené názorům 
těch druhých. (…) ignorujte radílky, kteří 
sami v životě nedokázali nic. 
D2: Chtěl bych vám všem popřát, abyste i 
nadále byli svobodnými osobnostmi, které 
si vytvářejí svůj vlastní názor a nenechají 
se nikým manipulovat. 
D3: Nevšímejte si příliš poštěkávání a 
vřeštění našich novinářských komentátorů, 
kteří jako obvykle píší o všem a nerozumí 
ničemu. 
consider themselves better than the rest of 
us, who keep mentoring us on what to do 
and who regard their views superior to those 
of others. (…) ignore the smart alecks who 
have yet to prove themselves. 
D2: I would like to wish everyone, to keep 
on being free people, which form their own 
opinion and do not let themselves be 
manipulated by anyone. 
D3: Do not mind too much the barking and 
screeching of our news commentators, who, 
as usual, write about everything and 
understand nothing. 
GAL = Green, 
Alternative, 
Libertarian 
D2: Klimatičtí proroci mají ovšem i 
důsledky, které už nejsou naivní, nejsou 
idealistické, ale jsou velmi a velmi 
přízemní. (…) Věřím, že nedojde k tomu, 
aby úvahy o zelené Evropě dosáhly té 
míry, že se zde objeví například i zelené 
bankovnictví, to znamená, že úvěry 
nebudou poskytovány podle bonity 
investičních projektů, ale podle zelené 
ideologie. 
D3: Dokonce i herci, z nichž někteří si 
stěžovali, že nemají kšefty, by udělali lépe, 
kdyby například navštívili domovy 
důchodců a přinesli tam trochu radosti. 
D4: jakýsi divadelní principál zcela 
nedávno prohlásil, že koronavirus je 
jenom lehká chřipka, a kritizoval opatření 
vlády. (…) Mám tím samozřejmě na mysli 
takzvané antirouškaře, ale i další, zubaře, 
kardiology, zpěváky. 
D2: However the climate profets have also 
effects, which are not naive nor idealistic 
anymore, but they are very and very 
earthbound. (…) I believe that the 
reflections on green Europe will not achieve 
such a degree that for example green 
banking will appear here, that credits will 
not be given based on the quality of an 
investment project but according to the 
green ideology.  
D3: Even actors, some of whom complained 
they didn’t have gigs, would do better if 
they would for example visit a retirement 
home and bring some happiness there.  
D4: some theatre manager quite recently 
proclaimed, that coronavirus is just a light 
flu and criticized Government’s measures. 
(…) Of course, I mean the so-called Anti-
Mask people, but also others, dentists, 






Service, the EU)  
 
D1: ti, kdo nás neustále varují před špiony, 
z nás tak trochu dělají nesvéprávné a 
manipulovatelné bytosti, které se nedokáží 
samy ubránit (…) A tito lidé nám chtějí 
radit. A totéž se samozřejmě týká i 
neúspěšných politiků. 
D2: kritizována právě těmi, kdo přispěli k 
jeho pomalosti. (…) Víte, co to jsou v 
tomto smyslu parašutisti? To jsou lidé, 
kteří jsou na kandidátku shozeni shora. 
Buď jsou to straničtí funkcionáři nebo 
lidé, kteří nemají žádnou zkušenost s 
řízením velkých společenských celků. 
D3: Chtěl bych rovněž naši opozici vyzvat 
k tomu, aby podporovala opatření vlády, a 
pokud toho není schopna, tak aby alespoň 
po dobu karantény mlčela. 
D1: those who constantly warn us of spies, 
try to make us incapable beings, easy to 
manipulate and lacking the capacity to 
protect ourselves (…) And these people 
want to advise us. The same applies to 
unsuccessful politicians, of course. 
D2: criticized by those who contributed to 
its slowness (…) Do you know who the 
parachutists are in this sense? They are 
people, who are thrown on the candidate list 
from the top. Either party members or 
people who have no experience with the 
management of large social collectives. 
D3: I would also like to ask the opposition 
to support the Government’s measures, and 
if it is unable to do so, to be at least quiet 
during the quarantine. 
Figure 14. Discourse Analysis of the President’s construction of social antagonism (own table) 
 




7.2 Discourse Analysis of the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš  
In order to characterize the Prime Minister’s agenda and rhetorical strategies, with a 
special focus on the construction of social antagonism, and thus uncover the changes in the 
official Czech discourse and its impact on democracy, the following four discourses were 
analyzed: 
D5: “Preamble and Key Government Priorities” in the Policy Statement of the Government of 
the Czech Republic (27/06/2018), original Czech title: Programové prohlášení vlády -
Preambule a zásadní priority vlády 
D6: Prime Minister’s New Year’s Speech (01/01/2020), original Czech title: Novoroční 
projev předsedy vlády  
D7: Prime Minister’s Address to all Citizens (23/03/2020), original Czech title: Projev 
předsedy vlády k občanům 
D8: Prime Minister´s Extraordinary Speech (21/09/2020), original Czech title: Mimořádný 
projev předsedy vlády 
Prime Minister Babiš: Agenda 
Message Quotation (CZ) Translation (EN) Interpretation 
We particularly 
think of our 
children and 
seniors. 
D5: „naši potomci nám 
neodpustí, že jsme neudělali 
všechno, co jsme měli a mohli 
udělat. (…) slevy z jízdného 
ve vlacích a autobusech pro 
seniory nad 65 let, žáky a 
studenty do dovršení věku 26 
let. (…) rychlejší realizaci 
výstavby dostupného bydlení 
pro seniory a také pro mladé 
rodiny“ 
D5: “our offsprings will not 
forgive us if we do not do 
everything that we should and 
could have done.(…) 
discounted train and bus fares 
for seniors over the age of 65, 
school pupils, and students up 
to the age of 26. (…) faster 
construction of affordable 
housing for seniors and young 
families” 
The elderly have life 
experience and 
children are our 
future. Hence, pension 
reform, discounted 
train and bus fares, 
construction of 
affordable housing for 
seniors and young 
families are priorities. 
D6: „Naše budoucnost závisí 
na našich dětech. (…) 
Nejdůležitější věc v životě je 
rodina a děti. Mít děti. Čím 
víc dětí budeme mít, tím líp se 
budeme mít.“ 
D6: “Our future depends on our 
children. (…) The most 
important thing in life is family 
and children. Having children. 
The more children we have, the 
better off we will be.” 
D7: „Děkuju všem seniorům. 
(…) Potřebujeme vás, ani 
nevíte jak. Děti potřebují 
babičky a dědečky a staří lidé 
mají životní zkušenost, která 
je pro nás a vždy byla 
nesmírně důležitá.  
Dědečkové a babičky, jste 
naši, potřebujeme vás, dávejte 
na sebe pozor, prosím.“ 
D7: “I thank all our senior 
citizens (…) We need you, 
more than you can know. 
Children need their 
grandmothers and grandfathers; 
old people have life experience 
that is, and has always been, 
extremely important to us.  
So grandfathers and 
grandmothers, you are ours, we 
need you, do please take care of 
yourselves.” 
D8: „Právě starší a nemocné 
lidi musíme ochránit.“ 
D8: “And it is older people and 
the sick we have to protect. ” 












všude (…) jednotné služby. 
Vytvoříme centrální portál 
státu, kde si občan bude moci 
vše vyřídit, a k tomu 
využijeme služeb České pošty 
pro ty občany, kteří internet 
nemají. Elektronizace musí 
být všude, kde je to možné.“ 
D5: “high-speed internet to be 
available everywhere. (…) We 
will create a centralized 
government portal where 
citizens can sort out all of their 
needs, and we will draw on 
Czech Post’s services for those 
who do not have internet. 
Computerization must be in 
place wherever possible.” 
Like the President, the 
PM promotes the 
digitalization. 
D6: „Jeden úřad. Jedno 
razítko. To je to hlavní 
zaklínadlo. 
Zjednodušení do života 
přinese i digitalizace.“ 
D6: “One office. One stamp. 
That is the magic formula. 
Digitization will also simplify 
lives.” 
We offer a new 
long-term vision 
for a prosperous 
future of the 
Czech Republic. 
D5: „Prostě mysleme na 
budoucnost a nežijme jen 
dneškem. (…) Chceme jím 
posunout hospodářství a celou 
společnost novým směrem, 
který by měl zaručit, aby naše 
země obstála v evropské 
ekonomice a v měnícím se 
světě.“  
D5: “let’s think about the future 
instead of only living for today. 
(…) we would like to guide the 
economy and society at large in 
a new direction guaranteeing 
that our country can hold its 
own in the European economy 
and in a changing world.” 
Questionable, short-
term populist policies 
taking advantage of 
the favorable 
economic situation in 
Europe to increase 
government-spending 
and debt. No profound 
moral appeal, only 
materialist vision.  D6: „kompletní investiční 
potenciál naší země na 
příštích 30 let“ 
D6: “the complete investment 
potential of our country for the 
next 30 years” 
We do not just 
talk about goals 
like other 
politicians, but we 
work hard to 
achieve them. 
D5: „Nechceme o tom, co nás 
v budoucnu čeká, vést pouze 
diskuse, ale chceme udělat vše 
pro to, abychom se měli lépe. 
(…) Chceme konkrétní kroky 
bez zdlouhavých a 
neplodných diskusí.“ 
D5: “Rather than just debating 
what the future holds for us, we 
want to move beyond words 
and do everything we can to 
improve our lot. (…) We want 
to engage in specific action 
without lengthy and futile 
debate.” 
The Prime Minister’s 
populist appeal is 
constructed on his 
identity of an outsider 
with a non-political 
background, despite 
his past involvement 
with top politicians. 
Being a successful 
businessman, Andrej 
Babiš promised to run 
the state like a 
business and work 
hard – unlike 
politicians, as the 
slogans of his ANO 
movement declare. 
D6: „Vím, opozice říká, že je 
celý ten náš národní plán 
nereálný. Zase ta skepse, ten 
negativismus za každou cenu. 
Budu na ministry naléhat, aby 
s plánem aktivně pracovali a 
realizovali ho podle 
připravenosti jednotlivých 
projektů.“ 
D6: “I know the opposition says 
that our national plan is 
unrealistic. Once again: the 
same scepticism, the negativism 
at all costs. I will impress upon 
the ministers to actively work 
with this plan and implement it 
in line with the readiness of 
individual projects.” 
D7: „Děláme pro to s kolegy a 
se všemi institucemi státu to 
nejlepší, co jde. (…) Celá 
vláda pracuje nonstop, jak se 
to jen dá.“ 
D7: “We are doing the very 
best we can with our colleagues 
and with all institutions of state. 
(…) The whole government is 
working non-stop in every 
possible way,” 
D8: „Od března jedeme sedm 
dní v týdnu a bojujeme s touto 
ojedinělou situací.“ 
D8: “Since March we’ve been 
working round the clock to 
tackle this unparalleled 
situation.” 
National security 
and the rejection 
of the migration 
quotas are our top 
priorities. 
D5: „Vláda ve svém úsilí 
zajistit bezpečnost a ochránit 
zemi před nejrůznějšími útoky 
zvenčí nepoleví (…) spolu se 
zeměmi V4 a jinými 
D5: “The Government will not 
relent in its efforts to safeguard 
security and protect the country 
from all manner of external 
incursions (…) together with 
Although the Czech 
Republic is one the 
safest countries in the 
world, the politization 
of migration and 




evropskými spojenci bude 
navrhovat jiný systém řešení 
vyvolané migrace založený na 
bázi zajištění bezpečnosti 
vnějších hranic, práva výběru 
uprchlíků na území před 
vnějšími hranicemi Evropské 
unie“ 
the V4 countries and other 
European allies, will put 
forward an alternative system to 
deal with the migration issue 
that relies on the security of 
external borders, and the 
freedom to select refugees 
before they cross the European 
Union’s external borders” 
terrorism issues are 
on top of the political 
agenda. 
D6: „Tam, kde jsme odmítli 
povinné kvóty ilegálních 
migrantů a jejich 
přerozdělování, protože 
bezpečnost našich občanů je 
pro nás absolutní priorita. (…) 
Tam, kde aktivně prezentuju 
naše vize pro silnou jednotnou 
a bezpečnou Evropu. 
D6: “It is there that we refused 
the mandatory quotas for illegal 
migrants and the redistribution 
thereof, because the safety of 
our citizens is an absolute 
priority for us. (…)   It is where 
I actively present our vision for 
a strong, united and safe 
Europe.” 
We fight actively 
for national 
interests abroad, in 
the European 
Union. 
D5: „Jedním z hlavních cílů 
této vlády je boj za zájmy 
českých občanů v Evropské 
unii (…) Česká republika se 
aktivně zapojí do zásadních 
politických jednání v rámci 
EU. (…) Chceme být v 
Evropě vidět. Musíme 
důrazněji hájit své zájmy ve 
sjednocující se Evropě. (…) 
Nechceme jen přikyvovat 
Bruselu, ale chceme jeho 
politiku měnit.“ 
D5: “One of this Government’s 
headline objectives is to fight 
for Czech citizens’ interests 
within the European Union 
(…)The Czech Republic will 
actively engage in key political 
negotiations within the EU 
(…)We want to be seen in 
Europe. We must be more 
assertive in defending our 
interests in a unifying Europe. 
(…) We do not simply want to 
nod to Brussels, we want to 
change its policies.” 
Although the PM 
presents himself as 
more pro-European 
than the President, he 
opposes further 
integration. Instead, 
together with the V4, 
he stresses national 
sovereignty wanting 
only membership 
benefits, but no 
responsibility-sharing 
or solidarity. 
D6: „Naše vláda sebevědomě 
prezentuje naši zemi v 
zahraničí. Na půdě OSN i 
v Bruselu (…) kde tvrdě 
prosazuju české zájmy. 
D6: “Our government 
confidently represents our 
country abroad. At the UN and 
in Brussels at the European 
Council (…) where I fight hard 
for Czech interests.” 
We build a lot and 
reconstruct.  
D5: „Naším záměrem je stavět 
dálnice, obchvaty měst. Začít 
s přípravou trasy pro 
vysokorychlostní železnice a s 
rekonstrukcemi nádraží (…) 
výstavbu nových bloků pro 
jaderné elektrárny (…) začít s 
rekonstrukcemi památkových 
objektů ve všech regionech. 
D5: “We plan to build 
motorways and bypasses. To 
start preparing a route for high-
speed rail and the renovation of 
stations (…) the construction of 
new units at nuclear power 
stations (…) start renovating 
monuments in all regions in 
order to attract tourists away 
from the beaten track.” 
Contrary to the Prime 
Minister’s claims, his 
Government has not 
in fact advanced 
much in the area of 
construction. He lies 
about the number of 
kilometers of 
highways contructed. 
D6: „Od mého vstupu do 
vlády jsme zatím otevřeli 91 
kilometrů nových dálnic a 
zahájili stavbu dalších 163 
kilometrů.“ 
D6: “Since I entered the 
cabinet, we have opened 91 
kilometres of new motorways 
and started construction on a 




D5: „Prioritou je pro nás 
zajištění energetické 
bezpečnosti a soběstačnosti ve 
výrobě elektrické energie. 
(…) Budeme chránit půdu… 
D5: “We will prioritize energy 
security and self-sufficiency in 
the generation of electricity. 
(…) We will protect the soil… 
Unlike the President, 
the PM claims to 
promote ecological 
policies. He openly 
supports them 




D6: „mně i mým kolegům 
záleží na naší planetě, přijali 
jsme jasná opatření. Výrazně 
snižujeme emise skleníkových 
plynů. Investujeme do 
obnovitelných zdrojů. A 
připravujeme se na konec 
doby uhelné. (…) Jsem rád, že 
jsme v Bruselu nedávno jádro 
prosadili jako čistý zdroj.“ 
D6: “our planet is important to 
me and my colleagues, we have 
adopted clear measures. We are 
markedly reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. We are investing 
in renewable resources. And we 
are preparing for the end of the 
coal age. (…) I am glad that we 
recently managed to push this 
through in Brussels as a clean 
energy source.” 
abroad (in the EU) 
but is more skeptical 
about their 
implementation in 
front of the citizens.   
ANO 
party/Government 
is for everyone. I 
am the ANO 
party/Government. 
D5: „Ve snaze nalézt 
maximální možný konsenzus 
je vláda připravena do plnění 
priorit vlády a programového 
prohlášení zapojit i odborníky 
opozice, zástupce sociálních 
partnerů, profesní a zájmová 
sdružení a organizace i 
územní samosprávy.“ 
D5: “The Government stands 
ready to involve the 
opposition’s experts, social 
partners’ representatives, 
professional associations, 
interest groupings, other similar 
organisations, and local 
government in the 
implementation of government 
priorities and the Policy 
Statement in a bid to find the 
maximum possible consensus.” 
This populist appeal 
reflects the wide 
electoral base of 
ANO, defined neither 
by ideology nor policy 
attitudes nor a specific 
social class, but rather 
by economic 
competence. It 
opposes the multiparty 
conception of 
democracy.   
D6: „Ale chceme zapojit i vás, 
všechny občany naší země. 
Do diskuse. Do národních 
konzultací. Podívejte se, co v 
plánu podle vás chybí, nebo 
co naopak nechcete. Pojďme o 
tom diskutovat. Napište mi na 
mailovou adresu 
narodnikonzultace@vlada.cz.“ 
D6: “But I also want to involve 
you, all the citizens of our 
country. In the discussion. In 
national consultations. Look 
and see what you think the plan 
is missing or, on the other hand, 
what you don't want in it. Let's 
discuss this. Write me at the e-
mail address 
narodnikonzultace@vlada.cz.” 
D7: „Ale nebojte se. Jsme v 
tom společně a já jsem tu pro 
každého z vás kdykoliv.“ 
D7: “But please do not worry. 
We are in this together and I 
am here for each of you at any 
time.”  
D8: „Naše vláda se snaží 
myslet na všechny skupiny 
obyvatel.“ 
D8: “Our government tries to 
think of all groups of the 
population. ” 
We invest in 
people. 
D5: „Potřebujeme podpořit 
produktivní investice pro malé 
a střední firmy (…) pro mladé 
rodiny i seniory.“ 
D5: “We need to support 
productive investments for 
small and medium-sized 
enterprises (…) for young 
families and seniors alike.” 
As PM Babiš 
represents the will of 
the people, his 
government’s goal is 
concentrated on short-
term populist policies. 
Overall, he has kept 
this promise, indebting 
however the future 
generation.  
D6: „Protože hlavně do vás se 
naše vláda rozhodla investovat 
a vy nám to vracíte svou 
důvěrou a spotřebou. Nebudu 
říkat čísla, kolik přidáváme 
důchodcům, učitelům, 
lékařům, sestřičkám, 
policistům, hasičům vojákům 
a pracovníkům v sociálních 
službách.“ 
D6: “Because it is mainly in 
you that our government has 
decided to invest, and you will 
return it to us with your 
confidence and consumption. I 
won't quote the numbers of how 
much we are tacking on for 
retirees, teachers, doctors, 
nurses, police officers, 
firefighters, soldiers and social 
service workers.” 
I am open and 
honest; we keep 
our promises. 
D5: „Víme, že v té době vše 
nevyřešíme, ale chceme 
nastoupit tuto cestu.“ 
D5: “While we realise that not 
everything will be resolved in 
that time, it is our ambition to 
In contrast to the inept 
corrupt politicians, the 
PM claims to offer 




break ground here.” transparency and 
action, which he 
documents in his 
regular social media 
posts.  
D6: „Prostě jen plníme, co 
jsme vám slíbili a budeme v 
tom pokračovat.“ 
D6: “We are simply fulfilling 
what we promised, and we will 
continue to do so.” 
D7: „Říkám to otevřeně. 
Takhle to je.“ 
D7: “I say this quite openly. 
Because that is how it is.” 
D8: „Budu k vám jako 
vždycky upřímný a otevřený.“ 
D8: “As always, I will be 
honest and candid with you.” 
The country is 
doing extremely 
well, and it will be 
doing even better. 
D5: „Chceme (…) udělat vše 
pro to, abychom se měli lépe“ 
D5: “We want to (…) do 
everything we can to improve 
our lot” 
Throughout his 
speeches, the PM 
reiterates the main 
ANO slogan, “YES, it 
will get better”, taking 




factors such was the 
positive economic 
situation in Europe. 
D6: „Nemyslíte si, že se nám 
daří? Já ano! A řeknu vám, 
proč. A taky vám povím, co 
plánujeme dělat, aby tohle 
podle mě velmi dobré období 
jen tak neskončilo. (…) Čeká 
nás skvělé období. Jsme 
Česká republika, země pro 
budoucnost. (…) Máme 
výhled na rok 2021 a rozpočet 
bude jednoznačně 
prorůstový.“ 
D6: “Don't think we are doing 
well? I do! I'll tell you why. 
And I'll also tell you what we 
are planning to do so that this 
era, in my opinion a good one, 
doesn't end. (…)We have an 
amazing time before us. We are 
the Czech Republic, a country 
for the future. (…)We have an 
outlook for 2021 and the budget 
will be decidedly pro-growth.”  
D7: „Vedeme si velice dobře. 
A nepochybuji, že to 
zvládneme. (…) A vyjdeme z 
téhle krize ještě silnější a lepší 
jako lidé, i jako národ.“ 
D7: “We are doing very well. 
And I am sure we will see this 
through. (…) And we will come 
out of this crisis even stronger 
and better, both as people and 
as a nation.” 
D8: „Zachránili jsme tím 
tisíce životů. Proto jsme první 
vlnu zvládli tak dobře.“ 
D8: “we saved thousands of 
lives. That’s why we coped 
with the first wave so well.” 
We are doing 
better than other 
countries of the 
EU. 
 
D5: „Naši občané žijí v 
bezpečné zemi a to je dnes 
hodnota, kterou se nemůže 
mnoho okolních zemí 
pochlubit.“ 
D5: “Our citizens live in a safe 
country, a blessing bestowed on 
few of the nations around us.” 
To further convince 
the citizens of progress 
achieved under his 
Government, he 
constantly compares 
the Czech Republic 
to other countries. 
D6: „Rosteme. Bohatneme. 
Víc než většina zemí 
eurozóny a Evropské unie. 
(…) Máme stále dvojnásobný 
růst, než je průměr zemí 
Evropské unie, a velmi nízkou 
zadluženost. “ 
D6: “We are growing. We are 
getting richer. More than most 
eurozone and European Union 
countries. (…) We still have 
twice the growth of the 
European Union average, and a 
very low debt rate.” 
D7: „Jsme jedna z mála zemí, 
která nepromeškala ten 
správný čas na zavedení 
přísných opatření, která 
zamezí živelnému šíření 
nákazy. (…) Dokazuje to i 
mezinárodní srovnání, že 
jedna z nejpřísnějších a 
nejčasnějších opatření zavedla 
právě naše vláda.“ 
D7: “We are one of the few 
countries that did not miss the 
right moment to put in place 
strict measures to prevent the 
unrestrained spread of the 
disease. (…) International 
comparisons also show that 
some of the most stringent and 
earliest measures were in fact 
introduced by our government.” 
D8: „Bylo to poté, co jsme 
zarazili šíření nemoci jako 
jedni z prvních v Evropě. (…) 
D8: “That was after we became 
one of the first countries in 
Europe to stop the spread of the 




Švédsko šlo cestou promoření, 
což vyústilo v to, že tam 
zemřelo celkově 5 865 lidí s 
covidem. Jedenáctkrát více 
než u nás.“ 
disease. (…) Sweden went 
down a herd immunity path that 
resulted in a total of 5,865 
people dying with Covid there. 
Eleven times more then here.” 
We are a small 
nation but with 
great talent and 
values. 
D6: „Jak už bylo řečeno – 
nejsme velký národ. Ale 
obrazy našich mistrů, 
literatura, architektura, 
divadlo, film a samozřejmě 
česká filharmonie jsou tím, co 
ve světě zanechává významné 
povědomí o českém národě – 
o jeho talentech a hodnotách.“ 
D6: “As has already been said – 
we are not a large nation. But 
the paintings of our masters, 
our literature, architecture, 
theatre, film and of course the 
Czech Philharmonic are what 
leave behind an important 
awareness of the Czech nation 
in the world – of its talents and 
values.” 
To indicate that the 
Czech Republic is a 
talented nation, but 
governed by the inept, 
and thus needs his 
effective government, 
he emphasizes the 
traditional notion of 
“Czech golden hands”,  
D7: „Když se podívám zpět na 
zásadní okamžiky v historii 
naší země, tak jsme je vždy 
překonali odvahou, 
ohleduplností a vzájemnou 
pomocí.“ 
D7: “When I look back at the 
key moments in the history of 
our country, we have always 
overcome them with courage, 
consideration and by helping 
each other. In spite of all the 
pain, the suffering and the 
injustices.” 
We will get 
through the 
coronavirus 
pandemic if we 




D7: „koronavirus společnými 
silami zastavíme (…) Rád 
bych vás proto všechny 
požádal o trpělivost. (…) když 
k sobě budeme všichni 
ohleduplní a budeme 
dodržovat nová opatření.“ 
D7: “we will stop the 
coronavirus through our joint 
efforts (…) I would therefore 
like to ask all of you for your 
patience. (…) if we are all 
considerate towards each other 
and keep to the new measures.” 
Lack of a concrete 
plan, mostly thanking, 
calming and praising.  
D8: „Zvládneme to, ale jen 
společně, stejně jako na jaře. 
Právě proto zase musíme být 
zodpovědní, ohleduplní a 
důslední v dodržování 
pravidel.“ 
D8: “We can cope, but only if 
we come together like we did in 
spring. And that is why we have 
to be responsible, considerate 
and consistent in complying 
with the rules.” 
During the 
coronavirus crisis, 
we made some 
mistakes because 
we could not be 
ready for this. 
D7: „Nikdo z nás nebyl na 
něco takového připravený. 
(…) Proto nám, prosím vás, 
odpusťte dílčí chyby nebo 
problémy. Je jich spousta. 
(…) Já jako premiér země 
samozřejmě osobně 
odpovídám za všechna 
krizová opatření. A beru na 
sebe plnou politickou 
odpovědnost.“ 
D7: “None of us were prepared 
for anything like this. (…) So 
please forgive us any mistakes 
or problems along the way. 
There are many of them. (…) 
Of course, as Prime Minister of 
the country, I take personal 
responsible for all these crisis 




the public, delayed 
reponse to the second 
wave due to elections, 
loss of trust. 
D8: „I já jsem se nechal unést 
nastupujícím létem a 
atmosférou ve společnosti. To 
byla chyba, kterou nechci 
zopakovat. Od března jedeme 
sedm dní v týdnu a bojujeme s 
touto ojedinělou situací, na 
kterou nemohl být nikdo 
připraven.“ 
D8: “I, too, let myself get 
carried away by the start of 
summer and the atmosphere in 
society. That was a mistake I 
don’t want to repeat. Since 
March we’ve been working 
round the clock to tackle this 
unparalleled situation that 
nobody could have been 
prepared for.” 
Figure 15. Discourse analysis of the Prime Minister’s agenda (own table) 





Prime Minister Babiš: Rhetorical Strategies   
Figures of speech Quotation (CZ) Translation (EN) Interpretation 
Lexical choices and 
genre of 
communication 
D5: neboť takto koncipované 
řešení není efektivní; 
realizaci šesti hlavních 
strategických směrů rozvoje 
naší země; nechceme jen 
přikyvovat Bruselu, ale 
chceme jeho politiku měnit. 
D5: The solution designed in 
such a way is ineffective; the 
pursuit of six core strategic 
tenets for the development of 
our country; we do not simply 
want to nod to Brussels, we 









English words in 
Czech, statistics.  
D6: Moody’s zvedla rating 
nejvýš v historii; podle 
žebříčku od Deloittu; z 
šestatřiceti 36 hodnocených 
zemí OECD jsme desátí 
nejlepší; kde tvrdě prosazuju 
české zájmy 
D6: Moody's raised our rating 
to the highest point in history; 
according to the Deloitte Index; 
of the thirty-six countries 
evaluated by the OECD, we are 
the tenth best; where I fight 
hard for Czech interests 
D7: Celá vláda pracuje 
nonstop; Frajírci, co mají být 
v karanténě a klidně si dají 
společně pivo u dveří 
hospod, to fakt nejsou žádní 
hrdinové. Spíš zbabělci 
D7: The whole government is 
working non-stop; These show-
offs who are supposed to be in 
quarantine and instead are 
having a beer together at the 
pub door are not really heroes. 
They are cowards really 
D8: všichni jsme se chtěli 
volně nadechnout a užít si 
léto; je to otravné a ne moc 
příjemné; tam zemřelo 
celkově 5 865 lidí 
D8: we all wanted to breathe 
freely and enjoy summer; it is 
annoying and not very 
comfortable; 5 865 people 
overall died there  
Overlexicalisation: 
epistrophe, epizeuxis 
D5: Chceme i větší podporu 
pro boj s daňovými ráji, 
daňovými úniky. Chceme i 
podporu pro naše záměry v 
rozvoji jaderné energetiky. 
Nechceme jen přikyvovat 
Bruselu, ale chceme jeho 
politiku měnit. 
D5: We want also like greater 
support to combat tax havens 
and tax evasion. We also want 
backing for our plans to 
develop nuclear energy. We do 
not simply want to nod to 








public of progress, 
trying to regain 
support and 
control during the 
coronavirus 
pandemic.  
D6: Dokážeme se radovat z 
toho, že se nám tak daří? 
Nemyslíte si, že se nám daří? 
Já ano! (…) Ano, České 
republice se daří. Opravdu 
daří. (…) Každý člověk se 
chce mít dobře. Neznám snad 
nikoho, kdo by se nechtěl mít 
dobře. 
Tak vám přeju, ať VY, právě 
vy se dobře máte! 
D6: Can we take joy in the fact 
that we are so well off? Don't 
think we are doing well? I do! 
(…) Yes, the Czech Republic is 
doing well. Very well. (…) 
Everyone wants to be well off. I 
don't know anyone who doesn't 
want to be well off. So I wish 
for YOU, for you to be well 
off! 
D7: Děkuju všem, kteří nám 
pomáháte a podporujete nás. 
Děkuji všem zdravotníkům 
(…) 
Děkuju všem rodičům (…) 
Děkuju všem seniorům.  
D7: Thanks to all those who are 
helping and supporting us. 
Thanks to all our helthcare 
workers (…) Thanks to all 
parents (…) Thanks to all 
seniors. 
D8: ty roušky nenosíte kvůli 
Babišovi, Vojtěchovi, 
Prymulovi, ale kvůli vašim 
rodičům a prarodičům, kvůli 
D8: you’re not wearing 
facemasks for the sake of 
Babiš, Vojtěch or Prymula, but 
for the sake of your parents and 




vašim blízkým, kvůli vašim 
kamarádům a známým (…) 
Koronavirus jsme porazili 
jednou, porazíme ho i 
podruhé 
grandparents, for the sake of 
your nearest and dearest, your 
friends and acquaintances (…) 
We beat coronavirus once, 
we’ll beat it again 
Intertextuality, 
references 
D6: „Milí spoluobčané, 
už delší dobu si kladu tuto 
základní otázku: proč v době, 
kdy nás neohrožuje, ani do 
našich věcí nezasahuje žádná 
cizí moc a my máme – jako 
stát i jako občané – svůj osud 
poprvé po staletích skutečně 
ve vlastních rukách, máme 
tak málo důvodů k radostné 
spokojenosti.“ Tato slova 
zazněla přesně před 
osmadvaceti lety, v roce 
1992 v novoročním projevu 
tehdejšího prezidenta 
Václava Havla.; Jak říkal 
Alois Rašín, jsme malý 
národ, a proto musíme 
usilovat o to, abychom měli 
co nejvíce vzdělaných lidí. 
D6: “Dear fellow citizens, 
For some time now I have been 
asking myself a fundamental 
question: why, at a time when 
nothing threatens us, nor is any 
foreign power interfering in our 
affairs, and when we have – as 
a country and as citizens – our 
fate truly in our own hands after 
centuries, do we have so few 
reasons for cheerful 
satisfaction?” These words 
were spoken exactly twenty-
eight years ago, in the year 
1992 in the New Year's speech 
of the President at the time, 
Václav Havel.; As Alois Rašín 
said, we are a small nation and 
thus we must endeavour to have 








metaphors, similes etc. 
D5: Chceme být v Evropě 
vidět. (…) Nechceme jen 
přikyvovat Bruselu 
D5: We want to be seen in 






D6: Představte si, že bych 
byl Harry Potter, měl 
kouzelnou hůlku a proměnil 
ty projekty hned teď ve 
skutečnost. Stali bychom se 
okamžitě druhým 
Švýcarskem 
D6: Imagine I was Harry Potter 
and had a magic wand and 
could transform these projects 
into reality right now. We 
would immediately become a 
second Switzerland. 
D7: včetně těch, kdo fakt 
nemají na růžích ustláno 
D7: including those for whom 
life is no bed of roses a 
D8: I já jsem se nechal unést 
nastupujícím létem a 
atmosférou ve společnosti. 
(…) Koronavirus jsme 
porazili jednou, porazíme ho 
i podruhé. 
D8: I, too, let myself get carried 
away by the start of summer 
and the atmosphere in society. 
(…) We beat coronavirus once, 
we’ll beat it again. 
Modality D5: Chceme konkrétní kroky 
bez zdlouhavých a 
neplodných diskusí. (…) 
Musíme důrazněji hájit své 
zájmy ve sjednocující se 
Evropě. 
D5: We want to engage in 
specific action without lengthy 
and futile debate. (…) We must 
be more assertive in defending 









further compel the 
audience, the PM 
speaks in the first-
person plural.  
D6: Ale chceme zapojit i vás, 
všechny občany naší země. 
(…) musíme investovat do 
energetické bezpečnosti. 
 
D6: But I also want to involve 
you, all the citizens of our 
country. (…) we must invest in 
energy security. 
 
D7: Chci proto všechny 
znovu vyzvat, abychom byli 
zodpovědní. (…) A 
D7: That is why I want to call 
on everyone once more to act 
responsibly. (…) I am sure we 




nepochybuji, že to 
zvládneme. 
 
will see this through. 
 
D8: A to nikdo nechceme. 
(…) Právě proto zase 
musíme být zodpovědní, 
ohleduplní a důslední v 
dodržování pravidel. 
D8: None of us want that. (…) 
And that is why we have to be 
responsible, considerate and 
consistent in complying with 
the rules. 
Hedging D5: To znamená vyrovnaný 
státní rozpočet a nový zákon 
o příjmových daních. 
Důslednou kontrolu 
regulovaných cen, především 
vodného a stočného. Lépe 
spravovat majetek státu. 
Bojovat s lichvou. 
D5: This means having a 
balanced central government 
budget and passing a new 
Income Tax Act. Rigorous 
regulated price controls, 
especially for water and 
sewerage rates. Improvements 
in the management of state 
assets. Fighting usury. 







used when giving 




D6: Ale chceme zapojit i vás, 
všechny občany naší země. 
Do diskuse. Do národních 
konzultací. Podívejte se, co v 
plánu podle vás chybí, nebo 
co naopak nechcete. Pojďme 
o tom diskutovat. Napište mi 
na mailovou adresu 
narodnikonzultace@vlada.cz. 
D6: But I also want to involve 
you, all the citizens of our 
country. In the discussion. In 
national consultations. Look 
and see what you think the plan 
is missing or what you don't 
want in it. Let's discuss this. 
Write me at the e-mail address 
narodnikonzultace@vlada.cz. 
 
D7: Ale jedna věc je jasná. 
Teď už všem. Vedeme si 
velice dobře. 
D7: But one thing is clear. To 
everyone by now. We're doing 
very well. 
 
D8: Epidemie je zpět. 
Bohužel. Čísla nákazy 
závratně rostou. 
D8: The epidemic is back. 
Unfortunately. Infection 
numbers are soaring. 
Figure 16. Discourse analysis of the Prime Minister’s rhetorical strategies (own table) 
 
Prime Minister Babiš: Social Antagonism (critique but at the same time wants to be a party for everyone) 
The Other Quotation (CZ) Translation (EN)  
Politicians/the 
Establishment/Opposition  
D5: Tato vláda nebude do státní 
správy dosazovat politické 
nominanty, naopak státní správu 
otevře a odpolitizuje.“ 
D6: opozice říká, že je celý ten náš 
národní plán nereálný. Zase ta 
skepse, ten negativismus za každou 
cenu. (…) Za naší vlády se nikdy 
nebude opakovat děsivá situace z 
roku 2009, kdy vláda právě v době 
ekonomického ochlazení zaškrtila 
veřejné rozpočty, vzala lidem peníze 
a tím ekonomické problémy ještě 
umocnila a neúměrně prodloužila 
D5: This Government will not parachute 
political appointees into state 
administration. On the contrary, it will 
open up and depoliticise state 
administration. 
D6: the opposition says that our national 
plan is unrealistic. Once again: the same 
scepticism, the negativism at all costs. 
(…) Our government will never repeat the 
frightening situation of 2009, when during 
an economic cooling down the 
government cut back public budgets, took 
people's money and thus augmented the 
economic problems further and prolonged 
them disproportionately. 
Migrants D5: odmítnutí existující úpravy 
uprchlických kvót (…) práva výběru 
uprchlíků na území před vnějšími 
D5: rejection the existing refugee quota 
arrangements (…) freedom to select 
refugees before they cross the European 




hranicemi Evropské unie (…) 
imigrantské kvóty, které odmítáme 
D6: Tam, kde jsme odmítli povinné 
kvóty ilegálních migrantů. 
Union’s external borders (…) immigrant 
quotas that we reject 
D6: It is there that we refused the 
mandatory quotas for illegal migrants. 
Media (not always, as an 
owner of a large part of 
media) 
D6: Často slyšíte v médiích, že, se 
ochlazuje světová ekonomika, že 
přijdou horší časy. Že všechny ty 
plány nezvládneme. Pořád se tím 
někdo snaží strašit. 
D7: Děkuju taky našim všem 
veřejnoprávním médiím, která byla 
připravená a zareagovala na situaci 
spuštěním nových pořadů, výukou 
dětí, ale i informačním kanálem pro 
seniory. Děkuji také všem dalším 
médiím za uklidňování našich 
občanů. 
D6: You often hear in the media that the 
global economy is cooling down and 
harder times are coming. That we can't 
manage all these plans. Someone is 
always trying to drum up fear with this. 
D7: I also thank our public broadcast 
media, which were ready and responded 
to the situation by launching new 
programmes, by teaching children, and 
also with an information channel for our 
senior citizens. I also thank all other 
media for helping to maintain calm among 
our citizens. 
Figure 17. Discourse analysis of the Prime Minister’s construction of social antagonism (own table) 
 
